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Edited by Noah Shachtman | Contact

Arquilla: Big War Toys Make Us Weak

Like a lot of other sage observers, Naval Postgraduate School professor John Arquilla isn't nuts about the idea of spending a ton on Cold War-style weapons systems when we're supposed to be fighting terrorists and insurgents. But Arquilla is one of the first military analysts I've heard say that "the Pentagon's big platforms [aren't] merely the wrong weapon systems to fight present and future wars, but [are] actually likely to bring defeat."

sheffieldhit.jpgIn an interview with Technology Review, the author of Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy explains:

[O]ur military today oversees spending of about a billion and a quarter dollars every day. Most of that is misspent... The principal argument for that is: "We have to keep the big, old-style military because we might fight a big, old-style war one day." But in the future the bigger you are, the harder you're going to fall to ever-more accurate weapons. Creating a mass army to deal with an old-style mass army is simply to put hundreds of thousands of our troops in harm's way needlessly.

TR: In short, smart, precision-targeted weapons like cruise missiles are going to become increasingly cheap and available to any government or group that can afford them. The Falklands War between Britain and Argentina gave early indications of the vulnerability of big platforms, didn't it?

JA I think so. The lessons there include: how many British submarines did it take to pen up the entire Argentine navy? Two. Simultaneously, the Exocet missile proved the slow-moving capital ship's vulnerability. Today, the Chinese aren't developing aircraft carrier battle groups, but brilliant sea-going mines that know how to maneuver, supersonic anti-ship missiles -- which means the Falklands War on steroids -- and super-cavitation torpedoes, which create a bubble of air in front of the torpedo, letting them move at hundreds of knots per hour. The Chinese have an explicit "swarming" doctrine that can best be characterized as sea power without a navy. In this new naval antagonism that's emerging, our potential enemies are not trying to emulate what we're doing. Instead, they're innovating in very thoughtful, effective ways…

Since we're spending so much on military affairs, maybe some of that should be directed towards technologies that will break our opponents' communications. In World War II, there was an investment in creating the first high-performance computers, for that very purpose. Today, it may be an investment in creating the most effective quantum computing or figuring out how to structure the vast ocean of data that masks the movements of al-Qaeda on the Net and the Web. We need a new Bletchley Park [the country house where the German WWII codes were broken], if we're going to win this war.

TR: Aren't our enemies in Iraq an entirely human network? It's not clear that breaking into their Internet communications...

JA: Oh, but they don't exist without the Web and the Net. You don't move around that country easily and even the old-school Baathist insurgent elements rely on the Web. A networked insurgency doesn't have anything like a traditional leadership. Most of the leadership they get is by going on websites, where they share information very quickly.

TR: Could we take down the Net in Iraq and would it have the effect of downing the insurgency to a significant degree?

JA: You could end all Internet access in Iraq and it would in many ways cripple the insurgents, in terms of slowing them down tremendously. But you'd also cripple reconstruction.

TR: So, in other words, we should data-mine Net exchanges within Iraq?

JA: There you go.

Latest Comments

Charles: Don't get me started on the Tofflers! ;-) My problem is that the "RMA" crowd are pushing this idiodic notion that "'puters and radios and aero-plane-thingies and R2D2 win wars all by themselves!"

Classic case of GIGO, and "SEGA-itis": What we have done is create a military that is extraordinarily adept at blowing things up, but that doesn't have a clue about how to "win the peace"....Which eventually gets more of its own troops very dead, and damned little else.

As to the log-issues, the through-put and/or volume isn't really the issue[s] -- it's the fact that Foggy Bottom's Neighbor of Five-Sides is increasingly relying on direct CONUS-to-troops shipping, since they figure that will "free up" forces...to, presumably, sit on their arses at home, instead of putting boots on the ground to fix the problems at the local level.....

Not that a sudden shot of "Clueless Remover" will solve the problem, but it would be gratifying to see in action.....

Posted by: MACessna at March 29, 2006 5:11 PM


Sometimes it's so damn confusing following Chinese military events. They're modernizing and de-Sovietizing their military on one hand, while investing in military technologies which seem keyed towards invading Taiwan and dealing with the US response.
Which would, of course, bring about economic disaster for everyone involved. Just who are we supposed to believe? And why are they buying up t-bonds, anyway? It's either demonstrative of benign intent, or preparations for some sort of economic payback. Or is it?
Confusing. Maybe I should follow baseball instead.

Posted by: TrustButVerify at March 29, 2006 3:01 PM


Thomas: The supercav torp is the Shkval, and the Russians are trying to sell them to whoever has cash. An American tried to buy the plans in the mid 90s or late 90s and ended up in jail; I dont' recall what happened to him. China probably has them by now.

Relating to battleships: The "torpedo boat school" was the jeune ecole, or the "young school". Torpedo boats work sometimes, as demonstrated at...was it Port Arthur by the Japanese, on the Russians?

The only problem with supplying from CONUS is that supply flow is imprecise. Centralized supply at a point near to the front allows for efficient allocation as needed, and direct supply means little flexibility or the ability to change supply loadouts on the fly.

While the Stark was hit by two Exos, bear in mind it's damage control center was hit, making life that much more difficult. It is unlikely lucky hits like that will occur, but they will. Torpedoes didn't make a dent in battleships because destroyers came out, not because torpedoes didn't work (that and torpedo boats are vulnerable to bad sea conditions and are somewhat lacking in range).

"The "Capitol Weapon" of the 21st. Century is information and it's use."

Information has /always/ been a weapon. Knowing a phalanx's right flank was weak because there were no shields facing in that direction, or that the enemy's cavalry is weak to enable double-encirclement has been around in ancient times, it's just a different paradigm with more advanced gathering systems. RMA has always been about information, but the Tofflers tended to emphasize the information aspect of things over the use and how we actioned on that information.

Posted by: Charles at March 29, 2006 11:35 AM


Big expensive war toys make us weak when we can't afford to build/buy enough of them to be effective. A/B/C/D/etc-22, call your office.

Posted by: JSAllison at March 29, 2006 9:17 AM


Re. super-cavitating torpedoes: "...which create a bubble of air in front of the torpedo, letting them move at hundreds of knots per hour."

Now, last time I checked, one knot was a speed measure, equal to one nautical mile pr. hour, making "knots pr. hour" a measure of acceleration. But of course this guy is a Naval Postgraduate School professor, so what do I know....

That aside, the supercavitating torpedo was, if I recall corectly, originally a Soviet idea, intended to blast big holes in US aircraft carriers. A nifty idea, too.

Posted by: Thomas at March 29, 2006 1:05 AM


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