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Edited by Noah Shachtman | Contact

Who Killed the Killer Drone - and Why?

In November, with great fanfare, the U.S. Navy and Air Force took over Darpa's biggest, most promising killer drone program, Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems, or J-UCAS. The idea was to develop a single family of weaponized drones operating from land and from carrier decks, backing up and ultimately replacing manned fighter jets. According to Dr. Michael S. Francis, J-UCAS Director, the program promised "a transformational shift in the operational application of airpower in the 21st century combat environment."

X-47Pegasus_4.jpgTwo months later, the 2007 defense budget split the program into separate Air Force and Navy programs. J-UCAS was dead. "We start joint, but we never carry it across the goal line for some reason," Rear Adm. Timothy Heely told Aviation Week after the decision was announced.

I'm on the UAV beat for National Defense. In recent weeks I've spoken to many Air Force and Navy UAV program managers and operators -- and none have given me a straight answer on why J-UCAS went extinct.

Janes has an idea: The Air Force and Navy drifted further and further apart on what their unmanned combat planes (the X-45 and X-47, respectively) should do. The gap got so wide, the one-size-fits-all approach stopped making sense.

[The] USAF decided that its present conception no longer met that service's long-term needs. USAF ambitions are for a long-range strike aircraft embracing stealth, endurance, ISR [or Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] and attack capabilities, and, while the projected [J-UCAS vehicle] clearly offered the first and last of these, there was seen to be a mismatch between the aircraft's range/endurance and its modest 4,500 lb weapon load.

Janes is on to something. A few weeks ago, somebody leaked Air Force plans to fold its half of the former J-UCAS program into its Long-Range Strike study, which is looking at ways to replace B-1s, B-2s and B-52s. Air Force Magazine explains:

[Long-Range Strike] would replace the Joint Unmanned Combat Aircraft System--slated for termination--with a larger, faster unmanned bomber. The aircraft would have to cover very long distances and be able to loiter in the target area with a good-sized bomb load.

Note that "good-sized bomb load" part. Last week, Navy Capt. Steven Wright told me that the Navy wanted J-UCAS not for strategic bombing, but initially for penetrating ISR and, later, for close air support -- both missions that require smallish, fast, medium-range aircraft like today's manned F/A-18s.

Air Force again:

The qualities the Air Force wanted in a next-generation strike aircraft were trending toward a larger and larger platform, equipped with a sizable bomb load and able to loiter in enemy territory for long periods, with periodic refuelings from a tanker. The size of the objective Air Force version of J-UCAS had been upped several times, and likely would have been enlarged again.

And that meant parting ways with the Navy and its smaller, tactical armed drone.

Defense Tech sources have another theory: that the Air Force killed its combat drone, Boeing's X-45, to keep it from competing with its manned fighter jet of the future, the Joint Strike Fighter.

The reason that was given (strictly off the record) [by Air Force officials] was that we were expected to be simply too good in key areas and that we would have caused massive disruption to the efforts to "keep… JSF sold." If we had flown and things like survivability had been evenly assessed on a small scale and Congress had gotten ahold of the data, JSF would have been in serious trouble.

And what was this shocking data?

Say the mission is to take out a SAM [surface-to-air missile] site using a Small Diameter Bomb. That SDB has the same standoff launch max range regardless of the platform releasing it. Given that the state of the art for Low Observable (LO) design and material is much the same between the qualified aircraft designers in the U.S., how LO your system is largely a function of shape and cross section. Compare the shapes and profiles of the F-35 [JSF] and the X-45C. Who do you think is going to have the higher probably of being killed? Of course that "kill" in the JSF case means body bags and in the case of a X-45C, just the lost aircraft and far fewer of them.

The Navy's Capt. Wright says that both the X-45 and X-47 J-UCAS demonstrators will continue development under the Navy UCAS program. Carrier trials are expected in 2011. Meanwhile, the Air Force will start from scratch or piggyback its UCAS/Long-Range Strike vehicle on an existing classified platform, perhaps the one mentioned by David Hambling here a few weeks back.

For more, check out Noah's January post on how the killer drone program got bumped off.

-- David Axe

UPDATE 5:40 PM: Not everyone in the Defense Department is sold on the idea of turning J-UCAS into a strike plane -- or on the idea of the new aircract, period. As Inside Defense notes, "Internal squabbling between two camps within the Pentagon is delaying the formal start of a study aimed at helping the Air Force shape its effort to field a new long-range bomber."

Latest Comments

Not too sure I buy the argument that the USAF is dead set against unmanned attack platforms. Sure rated guys don't like the idea of machines doing a man's job, but in the end, the capabilities will win out. Case in point: the AF is on the fast track to buying the hellfire armed MPQ version of the predator. Works great in a permissive enviromen, no? The great promise of the UCAV is possible end to the Jesse Jackson syndrome when a limited strike against a national IADS. Limited a-strikes are great, but if the bad guys knock one down and SAR efforts fail, whatcha gonna do?? The UCAV should have been seen as a niche system giving the warfighter a more persistent option than just lobbing a few cruise missiles. Hope they bring it back and quickly.
One afterthought, I'd bet the decision was based on $$$$ and priorities rather than pilot egos. The AF has changed alot... There are plenty of more mature systems now that need cash.

Posted by: shawn at May 17, 2006 11:40 PM


While all of you make valid points, the visceral nature of some of the exchanges tends to cloud up the reality of the debates. To wit: There are a lot of officers who I (a retired NCO)know to be "ticket punchers". The breed is the same as written about by the late Colonel Hackworth. Having said that, however, I do proudly acknowledge having served under some absolutely fabulous officers at any rank.My son, an Army Mechanized Infantry NCO on his second tour in Irag recently told me of his private counseling of a young 2Lt to get the kid squared away and into the frame of mind appropriate to commanding infantry troops in combat.

The point to all this is pretty strait forward. So much so that often times the senior officers (in and out) sometimes tend to forget that nobody goes to war alone and no branch of the service wins a war. Everybody brings something to the fight and everybody shares in the victories, the losses, the honor and insult.

The Air Force believes very strongly in manned aircraft in combat because the war is fought by warriors. The track record tends to support their views. Their decisions, however, regarding the A-10 were seriously flawed in the opinion of this old veteran who worries about sufficient support for his only son in the hell of war (this is its own hell).

The Navy has a different perspective. The Navy has a different mission. Comparing one with the other seems to me to expose a fundamental ignorance of the reality that our military must be able to dominate in every environment where combat can occur. That's why we have different services. We do need to get more efficient on mutual support and demand better and more efficient performance from those who command the various services. We're seeing a lot of duplication and pointless rivalry that we have neither the money nor the inclination to support.

Yeah, there's a lot of "pork-barreling" and a lot of erstwhile leaders who are dedicated only to signing off on things that are most advantageous to their own future. High tech weapons systems programs always bear the brunt of that vulnerability and as such must bear the closest scrutiny. We have to take a hard look at procurement for the sake of procurement. We have to ask just how much is necessary. We have to look at the reality of understanding the nature of warfare and understand that wars are won by properly equipped and trained warriors doing the things that most people either can't or won't do. Properly lead, they are capable of incredible valor. Improperly lead they are capable of unspeakable depravity. They are the most dangerous weapon in any nation's arsenal: They are human. That leadership must prevail from stars to stripes.

We One thing that is evident in this is that there are a lot of people who are watching. There are a lot of us who are willing to pursue the derelicts should their decisions lead to the unnecessary deaths of our warriors, complications to our nation and frivolous expenditures.

Okay, that's my two bits.

Posted by: Joe Bullard at May 11, 2006 6:40 PM


The Air Force, by breaking off and pursuing a UAV that is long-range, has long loiter capability, and carry a large payload, will increase the size of their plane to the point that it will increase the size and cross-section of the UAV at least to the equivalent of their JSF, and almost definately beyond. With the increased size making acquisition/tracking of it easier than the JSF, and not having trained pilots to give more depth to alternatives/reactions to a SAM/AAM launch against it, it will drop below the JSF for survivability statistics, and thus bring about the result the USAF brass wants.

I have to agree with John S. This sounds just like them.

Posted by: Steve B at May 11, 2006 1:09 PM


As a former naval officer, I personally put family as my first priority and left the service. However, most career officers I know, and there are certainly exceptions, place mission accomplishment as their number one priority, at least until they make O-6 and get stars in their eyes. After that, there are great ones and there are the others.

Our nation has repeatedly fallen into the trap of attempting to build complex systems that can be everything to everyone all the time. Two great examples include the Space Shuttle and the FB-111. Such "multi-mission" systems seldom if ever perform any of their missions extremely well. For this reason, I support the "death" of J-UCAV.

The current generation of leaders in the Navy are classmates of mine. I am convinced that most of them are forward thinkers, supportive of Secretary Rumsfeld's initiatives, and true believers in unmanned systems. Consequently, I have very high hopes for the future of the U.S. Navy.

Perhaps stemming the natural rivalry between the services, I am highly sceptical of USAF motives. One of the most effective weapons systems in the Air Force arsenal is and has long been the A-10. Repeatedly, the USAF and the combat pilots who lead it have attempted to kill the A-10 because close air support is not considered a "sexy" mission. While I have very little evidence to support it, I tend to believe the claims of those who report that J-UCAV is targeted for the USAF scarp heap because it is a threat to the F-35. I hope that those of us who so believe are wrong, but my experience with senior USAF officers makes me fear I am correct.

Posted by: John S at May 11, 2006 11:28 AM


Umm, let's see, "USAF doesn't want a UCAS that can compete with F-35 by dropping a couple bombs, so that's why they're pursuing a UCAS that can do what the F-35 can do but also can drop a bunch of bombs." Yeah, that makes sense. Pursuing an aircraft that can loiter over the battlefield and drop lots of bombs doesn't threaten the F-35 nearly as much as aircraft that can't loiter and can only drop a couple. Golly, I hate those darn stick-jockeys and their old-school paradigm!

Apparently after having repeated the lie often enough that all that USAF officers care about is their career and the chance to wear a scarf, it has become "common wisdom." Thank God arm-chair strategists stay right where they are, and not in ejection seats or at UAV flight control consoles.

Posted by: Jim Habermehl at May 11, 2006 8:45 AM


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