Israel Wants to Jam Sats
Back in 2004, the U.S. Air Force suggested that they might be willing to mess with commercial satellites, if they were aiding an American foe. The idea drew howls from outside observers. And, for a while, it seemed destined for an extremely quiet corner of flyboy doctrine.
But now, the Israelis are picking up where their American counterparts left off, Defense News' Barbara Opall-Rome reports. Fed up with Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV broadcasts -- which stayed on the air, despite repeated aerial and electronic attacks -- the Sabras are now talking publicly about "disrupt[ing] transmissions of enemy programming carried by commercial satellites."
“No doubt, we understand the power of the media, public opinion and mass psychology,†said [Maj. Gen. Ido] Nehushtan, who is responsible for IDF modernization planning. “Al-Manar is a liability, and we’re going to have to improve our ability to counter this threat...â€
...the only way to ensure persistent, reliable, wide-area broadcast denial is through an anti-communication satellite system. Israel must develop the means to surgically target signals serving Hizbollah without damaging the spacecraft or disrupting operations of other customers serviced by the broadcast frequencies, he said...
[But] according to [an Israeli] executive, jamming a communications satellite is “like interfering with civil aviation. You can do it, but it’s against international law and you’ll be subject to all kinds of lawsuits.â€
It is technologically impossible, he said, to selectively jam only those satellite signals that carry enemy broadcasts.
“Everything goes out as a single beam, and it is impossible to jam only those channels viewed as a threat,†the executive said. “If you make the decision to interfere with one [satellite signal], then you must be prepared to face the consequences of the collateral damage incurred to the many other legitimate users of the signal.â€
Robert Ames, chief executive of the Satellite Users Interference Reduction Group... said it is relatively easy to jam a specific satellite transponder.
“Transponders are separated by frequency,†he said. “All you have to do is know the frequency which it operates on and then put up a signal that is stronger than the programming carrier of the satellite...
Satellite interference capabilities have been around since the mid-1970s, he added. “But if the Israelis are talking about technological challenges, I assume they are aiming for a capability that goes way beyond what our companies have experienced to date.â€
The west should be shaking at the prospect of Israel cutting loose anti-satellite weapons. Sure, existing technology can easily support brute counter-space operations, and commercial assets are amongst the most vulnerable. Nonetheless, just as fear of fallout (both literally and figuratively) maintained the nuclear threshold in the days of MAD, so should the concept of counter-space ops be approached.
If the article is correct, several countries are considering (if not maintaining) counter-space capability. Few experienced observers were surprised by Serbian employment of local GPS signal jamming, but disabling space assets themselves crosses several dangerous thresholds:
- weaponization of space
- military engagement of a neutral
- creating an unlimited Area Of Operation
Crossing any of these thresholds is akin to opening Pandora's Box. Immediate tactical gain will almost certainly lead to far greater western losses given its much more advanced reliance upon satellite based systems.
Not that satellites are sacrosanct - protected from all forms of C2W and/or IO - but the process must be kept exceptionally discreet and very narrowly contained. Acceptable actions would likely be jamming a space signal terrestrially within a defined area, uplink signal jamming, and replacing adversary signals with your own. Acceptable because they mimic wartime action already accepted as "normal" military activity.
Risk analysis must examine benefits likely to be won. Probably few. Except in remote ocean regions, commercial satellites are multiple redundant and eager for business. Low cost, high-capacity fibre is rapidly diminishing everyone's reliance upon SATCOM. Landline redundancy is so complete that most circuit architectures are simply depicted as a "cloud". Exceptionally few conflict regions offer a comparison to North American reliance upon satellite for wide area banking, weather, communication, or imagery coverage.
Optics is everything, especially in democracy-sponsored militaries, where targets must possess public legitimacy. The political goal may be removal of the adversary's popular support; hence, an apparently simple target - denial of communication. But attempts to destroy media channels, particularly if disrupting service outside the combat zone, is perceived as media manipulation and truth suppression. And, because of the multiple redundant features built into INTERNET (which has grown to be the prime media distribution tool of many adversaries), denial of service is so brief that it's often transparent to the user. Only the image of an attempt to "muzzle the press" persists.
No military quote is better remembered than "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means". That the USAF develops doctrine to suggest means and methods (now echoed by Israel), does not suggest restraints should be removed. The limits of war, developed after a millennium of armed conflict, must be carefully weighed before sweeping those lessons aside. It was not a rise in social consciousness that treaties, such as the Hague and Geneva conventions, were signed but for long-term advantage to conflict survivors (particularly the victors). Today's massively complex world of global interdependencies cannot accept such freedom of action amongst combatants.
"Be careful of what you wish for".
Posted by: Millie at September 7, 2006 12:04 PM