Mech Infantry's Next Step

Jimmy Wu is an MIT grad in mechanical engineering, and a missile defense systems engineer at Boeing -- and a 1st Lieutenant in the Alabama National Guard, currently deployed in Iraq.

Back in the day, armored personnel carriers had a carefully-defined mission: As the battalion task force would roll forward, the APCs and other mechanized infantry would dismount and clear out an enemy position, allowing the tanks to exploit the breakthrough. To handle the job, APCs needed enough armor to survive that approach march -- and a whole lot of guns, to survive that dismounted attack. By the end of the Cold War, APCs had bulked up so big that they had evolved into Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs) like the Bradley: carrying almost an entire squad, with enough weapons to take on tanks, and the armor to back it up.

But Iraq has shown that all that muscle doesn't necessarily work on the modern, non-linear battlefield. While everyone appreciates the Bradley's armor and its the chaingun in the firefight, the thing is expensive to operate. (Witness the broken Bradleys in the depots that the Army does not have the money to fix.) Moreover, the Bradley usually are not carrying its full complement of dismounts these days; infantrymen are driving the Humvees to add more guns on the convoys, instead. When the APC is no longer carrying its infantry, it loses its raison d'etre. We might as well get a cavalry vehicle that can do the job better.

In fact, as OIF shows, on the modern non-linear battlefield, the mech infantry does not work as mech infantry anymore. The legs are more akin to the light cavalry of old, patrolling the lines of communication, establishing presence, and looking for the enemy. In this context, the infantry does not operate in the battalion attack, it works in a section/squad attack perspective. The shift in the mech infantry paradigm requires a new APC: One that works well as a light cavalry vehicle and can carry a good load of infantry.

The American experience with Humvees and other armored vehicles are indicative: When they roll out the gate, the infantry squad normally splits itself into two vehicle or more. This is because 1) more vehicles means more gunners on top to fight the crucial first few minutes of an ambush, 2) an IED or RPG would not take out the whole squad, and 3) the squad will have space for passengers or survivors. A rough civilian analogy would be a police squad car: A squad car normally does not have officers in the back seat.

What we have, in fact, is a small APC/liason vehicle, in the vein of the Italian 4x4 Puma or the American ASV. Such a small APC seats about 5 soldiers, including the gunner. The small APC allows the squad to spread itself out on the distributed battlefield. The small APC allows the mech squad to fire and maneuver on the march, restoring the offensive capability to the mech squad. The small APC, by virtue of its size, automatically limits its weapon load to infantry support weapons (50 cal, rockets) instead of engaging in the AIFV arms race. As fire control/weapon system is a major component of the vehicle cost, the less sophisticated small APC acts as a natural limit against the cost growth of a program like Future Combat Systems.

To outfit an infantry squad with small APCs may be slightly more expensive than with a single AIFV. However, if you add in the up-armored Humvees with electronic countermeasures to the AIFV squad, the cost projection would be a wash. And we are not arguing against a full-sized APC such as the M-113 Gavin. The Gavin, or a Stryker, can be useful when we need to bring more dismounts. The modern mechanized company team should have a mix of small APCs, full-sized APCs, and tanks to carry out its new cavalry missions on the non-linear battlefield. And as we start looking for Humvee replacements, let's keep in mind a small APC, instead of a better jeep.

-- Jimmy Wu

Dragon Skin: Proven Tough?

The seemingly-endlessly soap opera behind the new-fangled Dragon Skin body armor has taken yet another plot twist.

In our last episode, Army program managers in charge of a competing body armor system were publicly dissing the Dragon -- while they were in the middle of supposedly impartial tests to gauge the armor's effectiveness. "To anyone considering purchasing an SOV 3000 Dragon Skin - don't," one program manager said on an online forum. "I do, however, highly recommend this system for use by insurgents."

But the National Institute of Justice, which has long rated bullet-proofing systems, has come up with a different opinion, according to Soldiers for the Truth. Within a few weeks, the NIJ will formally certify for Level III protection -- good enough to stop AK-47 fire. If I'm not mistaken, that would make the Dragon Skin the first soft armor, without plate inserts, to get that high of a rating. And it would certainly call into question the Army managers' disparaging remarks about the armor -- after Dragon Skin went from ballyhooed to banned to grudgingly accepted for testing, all in a matter of months. Stay tuned...

New Twist in Dragon Armor Tale

After a few soldiers started wearing Dragon Skin body armor, the much-hyped alternative to the standard Interceptor defenses, the Army banned the flexible armor -- and allegedly threatened to cut off the life insurance policies of anyone wearing it. Then, the Army took a different tack, saying it would start testing the Skin, to see if it was up to snuff.

Now, one of the officers in charge of those tests is publicly dissing the Dragon armor, Jane's Nathan Hodge reports.

In comments posted on an online discussion forum, Karl Masters, director of engineering for Program Manager - Soldier Equipment, said he recently supervised tests of Dragon Skin, a vest made by California-based Pinnacle Armor.

"I was recently tasked by the army to conduct the test of the 30 Dragon Skin SOV 3000 level IV body armor purchased for T&E [tests and evaluation]," Masters wrote in a 6 June posting. "My day job is acting product manager for Interceptor Body Armor. I'm under a gag order until the test results make it up the chain.

"I will, however, offer an enlightened and informed recommendation to anyone considering purchasing an SOV 3000 Dragon Skin - don't."

Masters added that he would not recommend the vest, particularly given the threat from 7.62 x 54R armor-piercing rounds.

"I do, however, highly recommend this system for use by insurgents," he added...

Pinnacle officials have consistently maintained Dragon Skin passed the tests that were conducted in May, and said army officials agreed to continue tests at a later date. They say they are awaiting word from the army on the resumption of testing...

After repeated inquiries, an army public affairs official referred Jane's to Pinnacle for more information on the results of testing. Lieutenant Colonel William Wiggins, an army spokesman, said the safety of use memorandum regarding Dragon Skin is still in force.

"As our research community comes up with new products, we'll field them," Col Wiggins said. "You can be assured that we field the best body armour in the world."

The Army still needs tanks

The transformation of the Army continues. It's just that part of the transformation involves keeping the M-1 Abrams main battle tank production lines open for an extra eight years. Operations in Iraq have affirmed heavy armor's worth, according to Army Times. (subscription only)

Fort KNOX, Ky. — The armor community is alive and well and the 70-ton Abrams tank has a bright future on the urban battlefield, even in a force moving increasingly toward lighter, more mobile fighting platforms, Army leaders said.

“Without tanks, we don’t have combined arms,” said Gen. B.B. Bell, commanding general of Eighth U.S. Army Korea, who spoke to a packed auditorium May 18 during this year’s Armor Warfighting Symposium about tank successes on the Iraq battlefield.

Bell emphasized the tank’s important role in a complicated fight, pointing to its decades-old lethality, ability to adapt to open terrain and urban settings, the survivability factor for crews, and the fact that a heavy-armor task force can be deployed in as little as 96 hours.

Bell points out that urban operations are nothing new for the Army, and that tanks are major part of our ability to be successful in the cities. Tanks led the way during the initial invasion and have been prominent weapons in nearly every major operation as well as important in the day-to-day mission.

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Richard Cody pointed out that the Army was not really prepared for modern warfare before the 9/11 attacks in 2001. It was under-trained, under-equipped, and in a generally-poor state of maintenance. But war has changed that to a great extent, and the place of the tank in the new and improved US Army has been re-thought.

“The opportunity to invest came to fruition when we went to war,” [Col. Larry Hollingsworth, Heavy Brigade Combat Team project manager] said. “It became apparent to people that the risks you could assume with your force during a peacetime environment were very different from the risks you could assume during wartime.”

“If you’re not going to fight with tanks and Bradleys, you may not want to invest in them the same way as if you were going to have to roll them into Baghdad. I think that’s what our entire Army has seen,” Hollingsworth said.

Note the machine gun shield with ballistic glass in the pictured M1A1 (pic from DoD). This is a recent addition to the old warhorse which increases protection while maintaining vital sight lines for the man on the gun. Other improvements for the M1, collectively known as the TUSK program ("Tank Urban Survival Kit"), are in the pipeline to transform our tanks into even more lethal monsters on today's battlefields, also known quaintly as "cities". Many times "transformation" isn't revolutionary but instead incremental.

It's not been just tanks, either, that have had their worth re-evaluated lately. It's also been the B-52 bomber, the A-10 attack plane, the 7.62x51mm rifle round, the M79 "blooper" grenade launcher, and many other systems, most of which are considered "old school" and had been slated for retirement. Some had already been put out to pasture but rushed back into service when the need arose. Sometimes it is because new gee-whiz gadgets don't work as expected, and we could have worse problems than to learn that the systems we already have are the ones we need.

--cross-posted by Murdoc

More Body Armor. Ugh.

The seemingly endless drive to encase soldiers and marines in more and more armor continues -- whether the troops want it or not. The lastest, Inside Defense tells us, is "QuadGuard," a full body suit that's been shipped out to about 5,000 marines in Iraq. There's no mention of how many of 'em are actually using the things.

QuadGuard is made out of "Dyneema," supposedly "15 times stronger than steel." Worn with the standard Interceptor body armor, it comes in two models: QuadGuard IV is a one-piece. QuadGuard V is more modular, "allowing marines to remove some parts of the equipment if they are not necessary." Total weight: about nine and a half pounds. That's on top of the approximately 42 pounds taken up by fully-loaded Interceptor gear, and the 5-6 pounds for the newly-required, side and shoulder guards. (Let's not even get into that crazy facial armor or the moon suit.)

Designed by researchers at Oklahoma State University, with some Naval Research Lab cash, QuadGuard has the potential to "reduce fatalities by 10% and serious injuries by 30-40%," its backers claim. Of course, there's mention of how many of those benefits will be given back, with the additional heat, weight, and loss of mobility that comes with all that extra gear. Could this help some ultra-exposed troops? Sure. Let's just hope the higher-ups don't start forcing everyone on patrol to stop wearing 'em. Especially not when the Iraqi summer is starting to kick in, and temperatures start climbing into the high 130's. As Sgt. Eric Daniel noted a few months back:

Something folks don't take into consideration is the tradeoffs associated with wearing additional armor. Just before I rotated out, we were getting issued the DAPS (deltoid auxiliary something-or-other...) and the "space marine" shoulder pads. While these offered additional protection to the side of the chest and shoulders (from small arms fire and small fragments) they were so cumbersome to wear that you were effectively immobile while wearing them. In fact, it was so bulky that I could not put it on and then climb through the turrets on the LMTVs and HUMVEES; I had to put the armor on top of the vehicle, get in the turret, and then suit up. Furthermore, while my small arms protection may have gone up, I was a dead man when it came to vehicle roll overs or surviving an IED/VBIED blast. This is just with the DAPS/ shoulder armor, mind you. Now they're talking about equipping gunners with entire ensembles of kevlar armor (complete with portable AC systems). That's just insane.

UPDATE 7:42 AM: Inside Defense also passes along another interesting tidbit. Just six weeks ago, the Army said that any soldier caught wearing Dragon Skin body armor "would have to turn it in and have it replaced with authorized gear." Now, service officials are going to put the ballyhooed protective equipment through a weeklong series of tests, "to help the Army determine if the body armor meets the Army’s standards."

UPDATE 9:36 AM: Murdoc has more on the moon suit.

So Much for "Force Fields"

A few weeks back, buzz was building, fast, for Trophy, an Israeli "active protection" system that stops rocket-propelled grenades in mid-air. At the Naval Surface Warfare Center, demonstrations of the vehicle-mounted defender a went well, with the Trophy's four radars picking out out RPG threats, and firing a kind of buckshot at the incoming shells. In Israel and here in the States, test vehicles were getting equipped. Fox News got so fired up, it declared Trophy to be a "top secret... futuristic force field." Which lead some commenters on the lunatic fringe to cheer for the new "barrier of invisible energy fragments (perhaps light particles charged by lasers)."

But all the heavy-breathing didn't help the system, in the end. "The Army is passing up [on Trophy] ... to pursue an alternative system that won’t be fielded until 2010 or later," Defense News ace Greg Grant reports.

The Army won't say why, exactly -- only that "the issue with any [active] armor protection system is the 60 percent solution is not acceptable," says Maj. Gen. Roger Nadeau. But here's a guess: What happens when Trophy confuses a kid with a rock and an RPG-carrying insurgent? How does that look on Al-Jazeera?

The free-thinkers at the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation -- the folks who sponsored the Trophy trials, and who are planting the system on their experimental Project Sheriff vehicles -- have an alternate theory, however. The Army, in their view, is worried that Project Sherriff and Trophy might compete with its massive vehicle modernization program, Future Combat Systems.

The Army knew about Trophy — some 60 officers and FCS officials visited Israel for briefings, but not a single one asked for more information on the system. The OFT stumbled onto the system last summer and immediately moved to negotiate a government-to-government technology agreement allowing American officers unprecedented access to all the top-secret data on the system...

In fact, Army acquisition officials are lobbying [higher-up Pentagon] officials to allow the service to remove the active protection system and the millimeter-wave “active denial” [pain ray] systems that are at the heart of the [Project Sherriff] vehicle.

"Instead, the Army wants to field a Sheriff that eschews the active armor system for slat armor," Grant notes. And that's a big problem. Because insurgents in Iraq have started using a new, powerful RPG that shreds the cage-like defense.

The RPG-29... packs two shaped-charge warheads: a small one to blow up the reactive armor or blow through the slats, clearing a path for a larger charge to strike the vehicle’s hull. [The weapon] poses such a threat to American armor that the U.S. military has refused to allow the newly formed Iraqi Army to buy them, fearing they will fall into the wrong hands, the top Iraqi ground-forces general told The New York Times last August.

There is only one currently available active armor system designed to defeat RPGs: Israel’s Trophy system, according to OFT officials.

UPDATE 12:55 PM: Last week's Inside Defense had more on the Army's active protection reservations. "It is not just about giving [soldiers] an APS system. How do the soldiers work with it? How does it tie into the network? How do you know when to turn it on? When not to turn it on?" said Future Combat Systems program manager Brig. Gen. Charles Cartwright. "We could put something over there . . . overnight but have I got the logistics to be able to support," the technology.

In recent months, service officials -- not directly involved in the development of APS technologies -- have warned against waiting for a 100 percent solution. During a March 28 Institute for Defense and Government Advancement defense acquisition symposium, Edward Bair -- the Army’s program executive officer for intelligence, electronic warfare and sensors -- spoke in detail about how acquisition reform could better support the warfighter. Included in Bair’s presentation was the term "Good Enuf," at which time he explained that good enough today is better than optimum five years from now.

UPDATE 1:09 PM: Alabama National Guard LT and missile defense engineer Jimmy Wu says some of the Army's hesitancy is legit. But only some.

The cloud of projectiles from the active protection system is bound to hit people in addition to its target RPG. In addition, in an urban fight, the RPG gunners will try to get inside the minimum range of a Trophy system such that it does not have the time to shoot down the RPG.

On the other hand, there are situations where the Trophy is useful. For example, during the approach march [eg, highway convoys], where everyone is under armor, the Trophy will minimize losses from an RPG ambush.

Both sides have merit. However, if I was deciding, I would deploy the Trophy. By adding an off switch, the Trophy operator can turn off the system when there are many people outside the vehicle. Training is not a big factor because the small fleet deployed is too small to cause future training problems. Supply should not be an issue either because of the small fleet. We need to encourage experimentation on the battlefield instead of quashing initiatives like the Sheriff.

Army's About Face on Soldier-Bought Armor

AP: "Just six months after the Pentagon agreed to reimburse soldiers who bought their own protective gear, the Army has banned the use of any body armor that is not issued by the military."

In a new directive, effective immediately, the Army said it cannot guarantee the quality of commercially bought armor, and any soldier wearing it will have to turn it in and have it replaced with authorized gear.

Army officials told The Associated Press on Thursday the order was prompted by concerns that soldiers or their families were buying inadequate or untested commercial armor from private companies - including the popular Dragon Skin gear made by California-based Pinnacle Armor.

The Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, which is usually mega-critical of the Pentagon's higher-ups, agrees with the Army this time. "The Army has to ensure some level of quality... They don't want soldiers relying on equipment that is weak or substandard," executive director Paul Rieckhoff tells the AP.

But Soldiers for the Truth contends that, "Despite all the evidence to the contrary, including [Army Program Executive Office] Soldier's own ballistic tests conducted at two Army research laboratories that irrefutably proved Dragon Skin was a superior product, the officers charged with providing America's warriors with the best protection possible continue to maintain that the Army's home-grown Interceptor OTV body armor is superior." The site also has the internal Army e-mail telling commanders to diss the Dragon Skin.

A. There may be Soldiers deployed in OIF/OEF who are wearing a commercial body armor called "Dragon Skin," made by Pinnacle Armor, in lieu of their issued Interceptor Body Armor (IBA). Media releases and related advertising imply that Dragon Skin is superior in performance to IBA. The Army has been unable to determine the veracity of these claims.

B. The Army has been involved in the development of Dragon Skin and the different technology it employs. In its current state of development, Dragon Skin's capabilities do not meet Army requirements. In fact, Dragon Skin has not been certified by the Army for protection against several small arms threats being encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

"Active Protection" Speeds Up

Armies around the world have been spending a ton of time and money trying to figure out how to keep their fighting vehicles, trucks, and personnel carriers safe. Better armor is one answer. Another is to stop attacks before they ever hit.

Several of these so-called "active protection" systems are making progress, both here and in Israel. Generally speaking, they all work in the same way, Defense News' Barbara Opall-Rome notes:

• A radar detects and identifies an approaching threat.
• Target information is transferred to a kill mechanism.
• The kill mechanism destroys the target at a safe distance from the vehicle.

A few weeks back, Trophy, an Israeli active protection set-up, went through its first tests on an American Stryker vehicle. It's already being used to protect Israeli tanks against rocket-propelled grenades.

[In a] Feb. 28 test... two inert RPGs were fired simultaneously; one would hit the Stryker while the other was intentionally aimed for a near miss… Trophy was able to track the trajectory, discriminate among the two parallel targets, and determine which one would actually hit the Stryker before selectively unleashing its lethal countermeasures. The actual method used to destroy the targets is classified.

The Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation is planning on using Trophy on its Project Sheriff vehicles -- those experimental personnel carriers, armed with pain rays and sonic blasters.

Meanwhile, the Army is pursuing its own active protection plans. Its Tank-Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center has been test-firing a system which blasts incoming RPGs with foot-long fragmentation rounds. Raytheon has just been handed a $70 million contract to actively protect the Army's next-generation combat vehicles. Last month, the company successfully demonstrated its "Quick Kill" RPG-stopper, eDefense notes.

The precision-launched weapon employs a technique called "soft launch," whereby it launches vertically from the vehicle, pitches over, and is propelled by its rocket motor to the point of intercept with the RPG, at which point it fires its warhead. This method provides a combat vehicle with full hemispheric protection from a single system, rather than placing a number of them around the sides of the vehicle. It also avoids the concussion and stress that a more traditional launch method would put on the vehicle.

In addition, a vehicle equipped with the Quick Kill system would typically carry eight to 16 such rounds that could be launched in a salvo to counter multiple RPG attacks.

There are other, more exotic active protection approaches, too. Army-funded researchers recently filed a patent to stop attacks with parachutes. The Brits think they can stop RPGs with massive electrical charges. And a Navy-backed company, Aoptix Technologies, wants to "apply... high energy light based weapons" to keep RPGs from landing.

UPDATE 03/15/06 11:50 AM: "Lightly armored vehicles such as the Humvee are unlikely ever to get [Quick Kill-style] defenses," says Defense News' Greg Grant. "The blast pressures generated when the incoming warhead detonates would buckle lightly armored vehicles."

For lighter vehicles, an innovative air bag system is in development, Army sources said, called the Tactical Vehicle RPG Air-bag Protection System, or TRAPS. Made from the same material in automotive air bags, they detonate incoming RPGs at a distance from the vehicle and cushion the blast.

The air-bag defense is in its final test stages this week, and could begin production later this year.

Nadeau said it’s tough to develop an active-armor system that can be used around dismounted soldiers or innocent civilians. The hard-kill defensive warheads launched by the vehicle resemble huge shotgun blasts to shred incoming projectiles, and would prove highly lethal to anybody nearby.

“When you put it on a vehicle that is going to be around dismounted soldiers, you have to have the ability to turn quadrants on and off, to avoid the collateral damage,” Nadeau said.

Exoskeletons Make You Tough

Prototype exoskeletons are already making people stronger -- strap this Berkeley contraption on, and a backbreaking load suddenly feels about as heavy as a couple of copies of the Sunday paper.

But as anyone who's ever read Iron Man knows, exoskeletons are supposed to do more that make you strong. They're supposed to protect you from bad guys, too.

Fortunately, the folks from New Ipswich, NH's Warwick Mills haven't forgotten that key lesson. The company recently received a contract from the Navy to put together "Exoskeleton Blast Protection for IEDs."

Warwick has already provided the "protective crash bag material used to land NASA's Spirit and Opportunity Mars rovers." Now it wants to use that expertise, to "create a lightweight, flexible, multi-layered system that will effectively mitigate the powerful forces of tension and compression that can cause traumatic limb separation caused by IED blast."

Most existing body armor systems use a hard plate to protect against ballistic threats to the torso, and some also contain a softer fabric system to provide protection from fragmentation, but there is nothing available to today's warfighters that addresses issues of limb separation. This lack of protection leaves the wearer's extremities vulnerable to severe, often fatal, injuries caused by blast overpressure.

Our research efforts will seek to achieve an optimal material combination that can absorb and dissipate energy from overpressure and can also withstand fragmentation of 0.100-1.2g.

Only after they've got the energy absorbtion thing worked out, Warwick promises, will they move on to installing stuff like repulsor rays and energy shields.

Facial Armor Rears Its Ugly Head

No matter how many times soldiers and marines say they're not interested, there's always someone trying to wrap them up in heavier, hotter, more uncomfortable armor.

Reader AS points to the latest culprit: MTek Weapon Systems, which is pushing Stormtrooper-esque "facial armor" for our troops.

The mask weighs 1.3 pounds, is compatible with ballistic eyewear, and will stop a bullet from a .44 magnum. So far, there seems to be one marine corporal using the thing in Iraq. We'll see if more emerge.

Army Sec'y: More Body Armor

Hunh. So lots of soldiers and marines have chimed in on the latest body armor debate here. And just about all of 'em think that adding extra plates to an already heavy armor load is a bad idea. It's already hard enough to maneuver, they say; squeezing into Humvees is a particular bitch.

Army Secretary Francis Harvey's message: suck it up. He told the AP yesterday that every GI ought to wear a couple of extra protective panels along the sides of the armor vest, adding another 5-6 pounds to his load.

"That's going to add weight, of course," Harvey told Pentagon reporters at a news conference. "You've read where certain Soldiers aren't happy about that. But we think it's in their best interest to do this."

Now, "Army officials stressed that Harvey was offering his opinion," the AP reports. "They said unit commanders in Iraq and elsewhere make the final decision on what armor their troops must wear." Which is absolutely the right idea. The guys on the ground know best how dangerous their areas are, and how much protection is needed. But given the political pressure on this issue, I wonder how long it's going to be until that suggestion becomes an order.

Dissing the Dragon?

When the latest body armor flap broke ten days ago, several commenters here talked up the Dragon Skin protective system as a better alternative. Now, Soldiers for the Truth -- the group which ignited the current armor debate -- is passing on reports from two deploying GIs that "their commander told them if they were wearing Pinnacle Dragon Skin and were killed their beneficiaries might not receive the death benefits from their $400,000 SGLI life insurance policies."

According to Defense Review -- which has been tracking Pinnacle's gear for a while -- the Skin is basically your standard body armor, laced with silver-dollar sized ceramic discs. These are configured over the vest like scales (hence the "Dragon" sobriquet).

Some folks say the Skin is at least as tough as standard-issue armor, and it's flexible, too -- which should make it more comfortable. But, if I'm reading right, the basic Dragon Skin vest weighs about 8 lbs. more than the Interceptor OTV armor that soldiers generally wear now. That extra weight, I'm guessing, is the reason why one commander tried to spook his men out of their Skin. And I have a feeling this is just one commander's words -- not some Pentagon-wide directive, as SFTT implies. We'll see.

Vietnam Flak Vests: Soooo Light

In an earlier post today on the recent body armor debate, I used the oft-quoted figure of "25 pounds" for the Vietnam-era flak vests. A commenter on the post points out that Vietnam-era flak vests did not weigh anywhere close to that.

Some quick Googling reveals that the body armor used in Vietnam weighed in at 9 or 10 pounds. According to Olive-Drab:

• The M-1952 Fragmentation Protective Body Armor, developed during the Korean War, was the most common body armor issued to US Army troops and weighed in at about 10 pounds.
• The M-1955 USMC Armored Vest, used by the Corps in Vietnam, also weighed about 10 pounds.
• The M-1969 Fragmentation Protective Body Armor, the Army's replacement for the M-1952, weighed about 8.5 pounds.

As you can see, none of these approach the 25 pound figure usually included in stories on body armor. Somehow this figure has become ingrained in the minds of many, and while researching this post I came across a 2003 Washington Post story on MSNBC.com that used it. The article, Body armor saves U.S. lives in Iraq, was about the great performance and the acute shortage of the Interceptor Body Vest and ceramic plate inserts during the first year of the campaign in Iraq.

To make the matter even more curious, it was made again today in a release by the American Forces Press Service, quoted here. The release quotes an Air Force Museum as the source of the figure.

Where did this number come from? Well, while looking around I noticed these figures:

• Ranger Body Armor (RBA) weighs about 8 pounds. With the ceramic upgrade plate, it weighs about 16 pounds.
• The Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops Vest (PASGT-V) weighs about 9 pounds, and when combined with the Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest (ISAPO), the weight is about 25 pounds.

Both of these systems were introduced in the 1990s. So it appears that it isn't the Vietnam-era armor but the 1990-era armor that the current "Interceptor" Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) (pictured above) are comparable to.

One last note about the Vietnam-era armor. It's nearly legendary how often the armor was left behind due to its weight. One has to wonder what, despite the greatly enhanced protection, those soldiers would have thought of the 25 pound armor of the 1990s and 2000s.

--cross-posted by Murdoc

New Plates for Army Armor

Well, well. Just a few days back, a Marine report came to light blaming some troops' deaths on the lack of plates in their body armor -- particularly side plates that protect the warfighters' flanks. Now, the New York Times reports, the Army has decided to send to start sending those side plates to its soldiers in Iraq.

The Marine Corps, which commissioned the study in December 2004, began buying side plates in September for its 26,000 troops in Iraq. Army procurement officials said they began studying a similar move last summer after receiving requests from troops in Iraq, but were hampered by the need to supply a much larger force of 160,000 individuals.

The Army had begun supplying small quantities of side plates to soldiers much earlier in the war through its Rapid Equipping Force. Armor Works of Tempe, Ariz., which is making the plates for the marines, said it shipped 250 sets in November 2003.

Another manufacturer, the Excera Materials Group of Columbus, Ohio, said that since late 2004 it had shipped 1,000 sets of side plates to Special Forces personnel, the Air Force and individual units that used their own procurement money to buy the armor.

According to the Armed Forces Press Service, the side panels "weigh 3 pounds [and] will be made of the same material as the small-arms protective inserts," or SAPI plates, which protect the front of soldiers' torsos.

Other shoulder and side protection adds 5 pounds. Wearing all pieces of the Interceptor armor could add about 27 pounds to soldiers' burden.

By comparison, the "flak vest" of Vietnam came in at about 25 pounds, and the original flak vest worn by airmen during World War II weighed around 40 pounds, Air Force Museum officials said.

Soldiers and marines differ sharply on whether this extra armor is a good idea or not in today's war. Check out the debate raging in the comments section here.

UPDATE 3:02 PM: Sgt. Eric Daniel, who has written extensively for Military.com and returned from Iraq in October, writes:

Something folks don't take into consideration is the tradeoffs associated with wearing additional armor. Just before I rotated out, we were getting issued the DAPS (deltoid auxillary something-or-other...) and the "space marine" shoulder pads. While these offered additional protection to the side of the chest and shoulders (from small arms fire and small fragments) they were so cumbersome to wear that you were effectively imobile while wearing them. In fact, it was so bulky that I could not put it on and then climb through the turrets on the LMTVs and HUMVEES; I had to put the armor on top of the vehicle, get in the turret, and then suit up. Furthermore, while my small arms protection may have gone up, I was a dead man when it came to vehicle roll overs or surviving an IED/VBIED blast. This is just with the DAPS/ shoulder armor, mind you. Now they're talking about equipping gunners with entire ensembles of kevlar armor (complete with portable AC systems). That's just insane.

The bottom line is, in my opinion, we are going overboard with armor; just like you can't armor a tank every where (there's 2.5 feet of armor on the front of a tank, but only 1 inch on top) you can't armor a person everywhere. Everything has trade offs. Yes the SAPI plates could be bigger, but it really isn't cost effective to make 40 different sizes and it's impossible to tailor them, so we run with what we have.

We have gotten to the point that we're wearing so much of it now that we are combat ineffective (we're too heavy and too slow to chase the bad guys so really all the armor does is allow them to shoot at us with impunity. If the military wants to make our lives safer, rather than give us more armor to wear they ought to untie our hands and let us take the fight to the bad guys, by getting rid of the restrictive rules of engagement.

USMC: Armor Gaps Prove Fatal

One of the reasons I never got too tweaked in Iraq was my confidence in my Interceptor body armor. Now, according to the New York Times, I should have panicked more.

Piggybacking on a Soldiers for the Truth expose, the paper reports on a "Pentagon study [which] found that at least 80 percent of the marines who have been killed in Iraq from wounds to their upper body could have survived if they had extra body armor."

That armor has been available since 2003 but until recently the Pentagon has largely declined to supply it to troops despite calls from the field for additional protection, according to military officials.

The ceramic plates in vests currently worn by the majority of military personnel in Iraq cover only some of the chest and back. In at least 74 of the 93 fatal wounds that were analyzed in the Pentagon study of marines from March 2003 through June 2005, bullets and shrapnel struck the marines' shoulders, sides or areas of the torso where the plates do not reach.

Thirty-one of the deadly wounds struck the chest or back so close to the plates that simply enlarging the existing shields "would have had the potential to alter the fatal outcome," according to the study.

Trouble with the Interceptor armor has surfaced before. The Marines ordered the recall of more than 5,000 of the Interceptor Outer Tactical Vests (OTVs) back in May. Another 18,000 were recalled in December, says Soldiers for the Truth.

"For more than two years [Soldiers for the Truth's] DefenseWatch has received reports and complaints from Grunts in Iraq and Afghanistan that the Interceptor gear is lousy," the group notes. "In late October DW began receiving reports for war fighters in Iraq that the American Armed Forces Network was warning its radio listeners there that the Coalition had received intelligence about insurgents snipers that were being trained to aim at areas of vulnerability between Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI plates) – hard composite armor plate - where Coalition war fighters wearing Interceptor armor are particularly vulnerable."

Still, 80% of casualties? That number seems awfully high. Maybe the sample was off, somehow. Or maybe I'm in denial.

UPDATE 01/08/05 10:05 AM PST: Over on the National Security Round Table list, Phil Carter -- who's currently in Iraq -- echoes what guys like Nicholas Weaver and Joe Katzman have been saying in the comments.

What troubles me about this story (and the larger debate) is this: It assumes that we can and should put an infinite amount of armor on our troops, and that the trade-offs between armor and effectiveness/weight/speed/maneuverability are illegitimate. This goes to the "force protection uber alles" mentality that we talked about a few months ago. And I also think it reflects a larger ignorance about combat that's prevalent among many critics and decisionmakers. Risk is inherent in combat. We try to minimize and mitigate the risks to the extent practicable, but ultimately, we have to take risks to win.

Phil Fraering also points out this AP story:

U.S. soldiers in the field were not all supportive of a Pentagon study that found improved body armor saves lives, with some troops arguing Saturday that more armor would hinder combat effectivenes...

Soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade ``Rakkasans'' are required to wear an array of protective clothing they refer to as their ``happy gear,'' ranging from Kevlar drapes over their shoulders and sides, to knee pads and fire-resistant uniforms.

But many soldiers say they feel encumbered by the weight and restricted by fabric that does not move as they do. They frequently joke as they strap on their equipment before a patrol, and express relief when they return and peel it off.

UPDATE 01/11/06 9:51 AM: This rules. In the comments, a former Marine sergeant writes, "During the invasion phase of the war, only non-rates were issued SAPI plates. All NCO's and above wore only the vest into combat. Following orders, I collected all 'unauthorized reading material' from my Marines and then redistributed it to my NCO's to wear in their vests as extra protection. So, we marched into war with porn instead of SAPI plates as added protection."

Darpa Armors Up

It worked for robot driving. So maybe a little competition will scare up some new ideas on how to armor up Humvees, too.

That seems to be the thinking over at Pentagon fringe science arm Darpa. Its Grand Challenge -- the $25 million, all-robot race across the Mojave -- inspired some very smart people to come up with some very smart new ways for machines to manuever on their own. Along the way, the race inspired reporters to give the agency the best press its had in years.

So, not surprisingly, Darpa is rolling out a second competition: the "Armor Challenge." The agency is hoping that a series of "shoot-outs" will prompt someone to figure out how to create a defensive system that's twice as light as rolled homogeneous armor steel, but still just as good at stopping 7.62mm and .50 cal rounds.

Proposers should expect to deliver three (3) eighteen inch (18 in.) by eighteen inch (18 in.) panels for each threat to be addressed. It is acceptable to propose a different panel configuration or weight to address each threat, but armor systems that can provide protection against the range of threats using a single configuration will be evaluated more favorably...

Armor Challenge “shoot-outs” will take place periodically (approximately quarterly) throughout the program... After the shoot-out, the team's performance will be evaluated in two areas: 1) potential for reducing armor weight as determined by appropriate metrics, and 2) the expected cost of the armor in production quantities.

Maybe one day, the government hopes, the software and engineering behind the Grand Challenge can be used to create robotic trucks, so flesh-and-blood convoy drivers can be kept out of harm's way. The Armor Challenge, on the other hand, is meant for more pressing needs. Insurgents are getting increasingly wise about tearing through American armor. That problem could be compunded in the coming years, as the Army moves to vehicles that are much, much lighter than the current crop. The replacement for the 70-ton Abrams tank, for example, is supposed to weigh in at only 24 tons. And a big chunk of that weight reduction is supposed to come with lighter, tougher armor.

Parachutes vs. RPGs

All kinds of inventors and gagdeteers have come up with all kinds of ways to try to stop rocket-propelled grenades before they slam into a Humvee. The U.S. Army wants to blast the thing with a foot-long mini-rocket. The Brits think they can do with with a massive electrical charge. And a company called Aoptix Technologies wants to "apply... high energy light based weapons" to stop the things.

Reader NB has dug up a patent for a different type of RPG-stopper: one that uses a parachute.

When an incoming munition such as an RPG is detected by the tracking apparatus 12, the firing solution computer 14 determines the time of launch and the particular launch tube 16 and sends a firing signal to the igniter 24 of the appropriate launch tube 16. The igniter 24 initiates the propelling charge 22. As the propelling charge 22 burns, expanding gases 40 (FIG. 2B) that are sealed behind the obturator 26 push the mass 20 up the tube 16. The mass 20 continually accelerates in the direction of the arrow V until the obturator 26 exits the end of the tube 16. Soon after the mass 20 exits the tube 16, the cable 32 will be pulled taut. As the force acting on the cable 32 increases, the parachute 30 will be pulled from its storage container 18.

Simultaneously, the resultant force acting on the connecting ring 28 will cause the mass 20 to rapidly rotate as shown by the arrow w in FIG. 2D until the connecting ring 28 is facing rearward. As the mass 20 continues to fly forward, the parachute lines 34 and canopy 36 will be pulled from the storage container 18. Within a short period of time the parachute 30 will be fully inflated and flying directly towards the incoming RPG 38. The parachute 30 will remain inflated for a long time relative to the incoming projectile's 38 remaining flight time to impact, thereby alleviating the need for precise timing and fuzing systems. There are several mechanisms by which the collision between the parachute 30 and RPG 38 will render the RPG 38 less effective.

A significant amount of the momentum of the parachute 30 and mass 20 (which is similar to the momentum of the incoming RPG 38) will be transferred to the RPG 38, thereby slowing it and possibly causing it to miss the intended target. Secondly, the collision will cause damage to the RPG 38 such as breaking fins or crushing the nose cone. Damage to the fins and disturbance upon impact will cause the RPG angle of attack to grow, thereby greatly reducing its terminal effectiveness. Crushing the nose cone can short the RPG fuzing system, rendering the warhead inoperable. The collision between the parachute 30 and RPG 38 will take place well away from the protected vehicle 10. If the collision causes the warhead to detonate prematurely it is much less likely to hit or damage the protected vehicle 10.

Stryker Sighting

The Army's new Stryker wheeled medium vehicle has been in a lot of crossfires -- literal and figurative -- since its introduction a couple of years ago. Critics say it's too heavy, too big, too cramped inside, thin-skinned and expensive. Supporters tout its quietness, ease of maintenance and flashy new electronics.

Now that Ft. Lewis, Wash.-based Stryker brigades from the 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions have finished tours in Iraq, there's some real-life experience to help sort the truth from the vitriol, and the consensus is pretty good. National Defense Magazine quoted an observer in October:

The vehicle, designed to carry a nine-man squad and two-man crew, has shown that its survivability, agility, mobility and technology is effective in an urban combat zone where the enemy strikes at any time in numerous ways, said [Ft. Lewis general staffer Col. Michael] Peppers.

Having accompanied the 25th ID's Strykers on several combat missions in the town of Qayyarah, I'd like to add "adaptibility" to Peppers' praise. Soldiers are learning to use the Stryker to do things it was never designed for.

Take for example the TOW-missile variant of the Stryker, which was meant to take out tanks but finds itself in Iraq with no tanks to fight. So soldiers have been using its TOW sights as a surveillance device, parking the Stryker on hilltops at night. The TOW Strykers can spot insurgent trucks from miles away.

As for the Stryker's other amenities ... riding in the back of a rattling, cramped M-2 Bradley always makes me sick to my stomach. But on one quiet night mission in a Stryker, I fell fast asleep.

There is some talk in Marine Corps circles about buying the Stryker to fill the gap between the new Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and trucks. (Marine Maj. Craig Wonson advocates the Stryker in an excellent piece in this month's Proceedings, which is not yet on-line.) The Air Force and the Canadian Army have already gotten into the Stryker game with small purchases in recent years.

-- David Axe

Bomb-Busting Buffalo

"A few months ago, spray-painted graffiti began appearing on Baghdad walls," reports Defense News' Greg Grant. "'Kill the Claw,'" it read in Arabic.

The message was aimed at a new vehicle called the Buffalo, a thickly armored mine disposal truck that seeks out and disposes of deadly improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Its 30-foot retractable arm has a camera, to help the operator inside see what he’s doing, and a claw-like rake for finding and detonating the roadside bombs.

The insurgents’ graffiti was not quite the advertising campaign expected by Buffalo manufacturer Force Protection, but it is a testament to how effective the 24-ton vehicle has proven in neutralizing the biggest killer of American troops in Iraq. Since its introduction in late 2003, the Buffalo has become the favorite of U.S. Army combat engineer teams.

Grant's right. I spent a fair amount of time with engineer teams in Baghdad this summer, and they all raved about the vehicle. Not just because they were well-protected. But also because the thing had a kick-ass air conditioning system, too. And comfortable seats -- which is important on a 12-hour route clearance shift.

However, Grant gets it wrong when he says that "so far, nobody has been injured while riding in one of the vehicles, which have taken repeated IED hits with only minimal damage to exterior components."

I talked to several soldiers who had Buffalo-riding buddies injured by the handmade bombs -- and by their own thick skulls. These guys would dig up an explosive with the Buffalo's spindly claw. And then, they'd be so proud of what they found, they'd want to snap a quick picture of their prize. So they'd use the claw to bring the bomb right up to the Buffalo's cab. And then, the IED would go off.

More on the Road of Death's Bad-Ass Bus

Last week Defense Tech noted the RhinoRunner armored bus, and the post gathered a ton of great comments in the discussion section. Definitely worth a look.

One question asked was "What makes a RhinoRunner "better" than an APC?", and this email response came in to Defense Tech from sources "in the know":

What makes a RhinoRunner "better" than an APC?

The RhinoRunner is not "Better" than an APC...it is a different vehicle used for an entirely different mission. It is comparing apples and oranges from the tactical standpoint.

The difference between a "RhinoRunner" and an APC:

The armored personnel carrier transports fully loaded combat troops in a hostile "front-lines" environment. The APC in virtually all cases possesses organic armaments / weapons and must be all terrain capable. Normally, the all terrain requirement is satisfied via a tracked vehicle. Ideally, the APC is designed to withstand heavy caliber "direct fire" from a determined enemy. Price ranges for APCs are $500,000 minimum and can easily exceed $2,000,000.

The RhinoRunner is designed for "protected transport" of personnel on roadways, both improved and secondary. Never designed to be equipped with organic weaponry, the RhinoRunner does provide personnel being transported the capability to return fire from within the Runner. As opposed to the average commercially available "passenger-bus" or the "unarmored" standard military troop transport, the Level IV (NIJ) protection afforded by the RhinoRunner at the price of the RhinoRunner is quite remarkable. The engineering of the RhinoRunner has proven to be quite capable of withstanding the 360 degree "unconventional" aspects of the current insurgency as opposed to the more traditional one dimensional war where a front line can be identified. Unfortunately, due to the asymmetric characteristics of the current campaign in Iraq ...the RhinoRunner is fulfilling a unique and vital role in safely transporting military and civilian personnel throughout the Iraqi theater.

From a purely, and far less important, purely economic standpoint. The RhinoRunner safely transports 23 passengers at a Unit cost of $275,000. And since no RhinoRunner has been knocked out of service, it is proving to be quite resilient. Dissimilarly, it takes at least (6) $80-100,000 lesser armored HMMWVs to accomplish the same transport and 2-3 $100,000 lesser armored military trucks that are better suited for cargo transport missions. Payload constraints restrict most military combat transports from being armored to Level IV(NIJ) standards until such time as new "non-steel" materials become more available.

It must be noted that many of the comments indicate a propensity for VIP transport on the RhinoRunner. Statistics indicate that this is the exception rather than the rule in that military personnel and DoD contractors utilize the RhinoRunner at a rate far exceeding any usage by visiting VIPs, observers, etc.

Journalists and critics often make the mistake of confusing the many types of missions and environments that armored vehicles are designed for. M1 tanks have pretty much proven themselves to be the toughest and strongest armored vehicles out there today. But they make lousy busses. Just as you'd never use a tank or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle as a bus, you'd never send a RhinoRunner into a full-scale battle.

The RhinoRunner's larger carrying capacity makes it far more efficient when called to transport large numbers of personnel over great distances, and its armor is strong enough to protect its cargo in the environment its expected to operate in. Like all other armored vehicles, the RhinoRunner has a particular role to fill. The current environment in Iraq makes that role one that's required on a daily basis.

--posted by Murdoc

Road of Death's Bad-Ass Bus

"The only safe way to move troops and diplomats" along the deadliest stretch of road in Iraq "is in convoys of custom-made $275,000 armored buses," Defense News says.

The buses, called "Rhinos," look like something out of The Road Warrior... They roll in the dead of night, escorted by armored Humvees, with the road sealed to all other traffic and AH-64 Apache gunships loitering overhead.

The Rhino is all flat slabs of gray or off-white steel (there are two models in service) with passenger windows angled in streamlined fashion, like an old-time Greyhound bus, as the only concession to aesthetics.

The beauty of these buses is not in their graceful lines — they are as graceful as a refrigerator. Rather, their attractiveness lies in the armor, which covers the sides, tops and bottoms of the five buses in service in Baghdad. Twenty-six passengers ride in relative comfort on functional — if not stylish — vinyl seats.

The buses, each weighing about 13 tons and featuring bullet-resistant glass and 12 gun ports along with all that armor, are manufactured by Weston, Fla.-based Labock Technologies at the company’s plant in Ashdod, Israel.

Until three months ago, the only safe ways to move diplomats, contractors and others working for the government between the airport and the Green Zone [along "Route Irish" aka "the Road of Death" -- ed.] was by Rhino or helicopter. Now, the helicopters are being used elsewhere, and the only remaining safe ride is on the Rhino...

About three months ago, a Rhino took a direct hit from a rocket-propelled grenade. "Nobody was hurt except for some minor bumps and bruises," said Army Maj. Sharon Smith, of the Joint Area Support Group, who books the Rhino convoys.

Rhino maker Labock also claims that "it was the vehicle of choice employed by the military to provide safe ground transportation for the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, and General Dick Myers and his staff while they were visiting Baghdad in may 2004. It is also the vehicle of choice to drive Saddam Hussein and other V.I.P. prisoners between their confinements and the Iraqi Tribunal."

THERE'S MORE: For first-hand accounts of folks who've ridden the bus on the Route of Death, check out the comments section.

MARINES' BODY ARMOR RECALL

"The Marine Corps issued to nearly 10,000 troops body armor that Army ballistic experts urged the Marines to reject after tests revealed life-threatening flaws in the vests, an eight-month investigation by Marine Corps Times has found."

In all, the Marines bought about 19,000 Interceptor outer tactical vests from Point Blank Body Armor that failed government tests due to "multiple complete penetrations" of 9 mm pistol rounds and other ballistic or quality-assurance tests.

After being questioned about the safety flaws for this story, the Marines ordered the recall of 5,277 Interceptor vests on Wednesday.

ARMY'S ARMOR SNAFUS

There's an old military saw, that amateurs study tactics, and the pros study logistics. (Where exactly that puts defense technology bloggers, well, I'll leave that up to you.)

Today's remarkable New York Times story on the fumbles and fouled-up decisions the Army made while trying to get armor for its troops and vehicles shows the substance behind the cliché.

At the same time, in shipping plates from other companies, the Army's equipment manager effectively reduced the armor's priority to the status of socks, a confidential report by the Army's inspector general shows. Some 10,000 plates were lost along the way, and the rest arrived late.

In all, with additional paperwork delays, the Defense Department took 167 days just to start getting the bulletproof vests to soldiers in Iraq once General Cody placed the order [for them on May 15, 2003]. But for thousands of soldiers, it took weeks and even months more, records show, at a time when the Iraqi insurgency was intensifying and American casualties were mounting.

By contrast, when the United States' allies in Iraq also realized they needed more bulletproof vests, they bypassed the Pentagon and ordered directly from a manufacturer in Michigan. They began getting armor in just 12 days.

But new armor wasn't the only life-saving item Pentagon bureacrats failed to secure during in the early days of the Iraq war, the Times notes.

Long before the war, the Pentagon was excited about new ways to subvert these [Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs].

A California military contractor developed a countermeasure during the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Known as the Shortstop Electronic Protection System, it evolved into a portable device that was heralded for its ability to jam the radio frequencies used by insurgents to detonate their bombs.

Col. Bruce D. Jette... was heading up a new unit called the Rapid Equipping Force, which was given license to ignore the lumbering ways the Army traditionally fills orders from the field.

Colonel Jette, who has a Ph.D. in electronic materials from M.I.T., dodged the Army's research-and-development agencies and phoned his scientist friends to find a commercial robot that could search for explosives. He embedded his staff in combat units. He took manufacturers to Iraq so they could quickly modify designs for body and vehicle armor...

Some Pentagon officials say they first realized soldiers were being killed by I.E.D.'s as early as June 2003, and late that summer the Army's 101st Airborne Division issued a report that cited "numerous" injuries from I.E.D.'s in its plea for more vehicle armor and training to evade the bombs.

The Defense Department had been producing various I.E.D. countermeasures. But the Pentagon did not start ordering large quantities of one of the most promising ones, known as the Warlock, until December 2003, nine months after the war began...

Colonel Jette was frustrated, and in October he resigned. In interviews, he said as the rush of war wore off, the Army's traditional supply corps began reasserting lengthy contracting and testing regimens, leaving him increasingly discouraged.

"That perfection in testing becomes the enemy of what is operationally good enough," he said. "And the soldiers in the field are looking for good enough."

THERE'S MORE: Back in January, we took a look at the Maj. Gen. William Webster's year-long fight to get his personnel carriers armored up.

ARMOR BOAST HAS SOFT UNDERBELLY

When Army Secretary Francis Harvey bragged last week that every American vehicle in Iraq was about to be armored up, Defense Tech readers smelled a rat.

Maybe what Harvey was saying was technically true, readers figured. But a whole lot of those supposedly toughed-up vehicles would be protected with jury-rigged, "hillbilly armor" -- the kind that's cobbled together from scrap heaps and landfills.

Now, the L.A. Times has confirmed what the folks here had already guessed. "About a quarter of the 25,300 military vehicles venturing outside bases will have only the makeshift steel plates known to soldiers as 'Mad Max' or 'hillbilly' armor."

There are three levels of vehicle armor in Iraq. About 6,000 Humvees have "level 1" armor, meaning they were manufactured as armored vehicles, with beefed-up engines, air conditioners and equipment to handle the added weight. They weigh 2,000 pounds more than the standard Humvee, with steel-plated doors, steel plating under the cab and several layers of ballistic-resistant glass in the windows. They were designed to protect against rocket-propelled grenades, small-arms fire, shrapnel and some land mines.

Next are 12,000 vehicles that have factory-made, "level 2" armor bolted on in the war zone.

Then there are the 7,300 vehicles with Mad Max armor, slated to be phased out this summer.

The remaining unarmed vehicles won't travel outside protected bases, except on cargo trucks, military officials said.

When Chief Warrant Officer Randall Menough's crew began fashioning armor at Camp Buehring last year in Kuwait, there was no Army directive to Mad Max vehicles. But they did it anyway.

ARMY CHIEF: ALL IRAQ VEHICLES ARMORED

It took long enough. But "in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday [here's the prepared version], the Army’s civilian chief pledged that by next week, no soldier in Iraq or Afghanistan would drive outside the base perimeter in an unprotected vehicle," Defense Daily reports.

Francis Harvey, the new secretary of the Army, told committee members: “After Feb. 15, no vehicle carrying an American soldier will leave a protected base without armor.”

For months, the Army’s top officials have been under fire over a failure to send enough armored vehicles into the theater of operations... Harvey, in his first appearance before the committee, said the Army had tackled the problem, increasing the number of armored vehicles in theater by a factor of more than 100 since August 2003.

“In the fall of 2003, when the insurgency in Iraq began to intensify, there were approximately 250 armored tactical wheeled vehicles in theater,” Harvey said... By month’s end, Harvey continued, “at least 32,500 tactical wheeled vehicles will be in the Iraq and Afghan theaters, and they will be protected.”

Those figures include more than just up-armored Humvees, which come in a number of variants, including factory-modified vehicles and those equipped with “bolt-on” armor kits.

Gen. Peter Schoomaker, who also testified, noted that the full range of Army vehicles--including the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, Heavy Equipment Tactical Transporter, Palletized Load System truck and fuel tankers--are now being equipped with some form of up-armoring.

“The public focus has generally been on the Humvee -- we’ve made real progress on the Humvee,” he said. “The real boost has been in the fact that we are now armoring every wheeled vehicle -- trucks, HEMMTs, HETTs, PLS trucks, tankers, all of this.”

I'll take Harvey and Schoomaker at their word. But their accounts seem to run head-first into a December report by the AP that "of more than 9,100 heavy military haulers in Iraq, Afghanistan and nearby countries, just over 1,100 have received upgraded protection." Harvey and Schoomaker's testimony would also appear to contradict what the New York Times had to say about Army National Guard's trucks, back in November.

There are plans to produce armor kits for at least 2,806 medium-weight trucks, but as of Sept. 17, only 385 of the kits had been produced and sent to Iraq. Armor kits were also planned for at least 1,600 heavyweight trucks, but as of mid-September just 446 of these kits were in Iraq.

Anyone wanna guess who's telling the truth and who's spinning here?

ARMY PICKING UP TAB FOR G.I. GEAR

"To keep troops from spending what the Army found was an average of $300 per year on [their own] equipment, the service is now issuing troops everything from improved helmets to seasonal boots," Stars & Stripes reports.

The service plans to issue the gear to every soldier headed to Afghanistan, and to as many troops as possible serving in Iraq...

All troops would get better helmets and boots. Troops with brigade combat teams would get [an] extra kit, such as grappling hooks, door rams, battle axes and fiber-optic viewers.

“None of this is rocket science, but I’ve had soldiers say to me, ‘If my feet are cold, I’m not combat effective,’” said Chuck Fick, spokesman for the Army Materiel Command Field Support Brigade-Europe.

Another Kaiserslautern soldier, Spc. Gabriel George, had already purchased a fleece jacket and gloves similar to those he picked up Monday. He was nonetheless relieved the Army decided to hand it out, too.

“It’s better to have too much than not enough,” George said. “There’s always some sucker that didn’t bring his. I’m glad about it. It’s good stuff.”