China Cops to Sat Kill; Mysteries Remain

So Beijing has finally owned up to blasting one of their satellites out of orbit -- althogh a foreign ministry spokesperson says that "the test is not targeted at any country and will not threaten any country."

But space-tracker Sven Grahn, over on the FPSPACE list, is wondering why the Chinese bothered to hit the sat in the first place. After all, he notes, Beijing didn't have to destroy its orbiter, in order to prove its satellite-killer worked.

The Chinese could have put up a a target satellite with a miss-distance indicator and then launched the ground-based interceptor to fly really close without destroying the target. But who would have noticed? US intelligence perhaps - but what could the US have said? "A Chinese missile came very close to a Chinese satellite!" So what would the general public say? They could say: "just another unsubstantiated accusation from the Pentagon!" The Chinese would not want to announce such a test. To prove that it was effective they would have had to release test data. They also want to keep up appearances that they only want to use space for peaceful purposes.

So, the Chinese decide to really hit a satellite and create a huge cloud of debris. The U.S. detects the intercept and releases the [debris information], provid[ing] the general public with hard evidence that the test really occurred. This raised the credibility of the U.S. And the Chinese are happy because the message they wanted to send to the world has gotten out - loud and clear.

This sort of subterfuge is one of several reasons why Joe Buff thinks that the anti-satellite (ASAT) test wasn't just some rogue operation -- it was authorized from the top. President Hu Jintao "is head of state, commander in chief, and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party all rolled into one," Buff reminds us. "The People's Liberation Army makes sure that the CCP stays in total control of the nation. The General Political Department of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] has commissars everywhere who make sure the armed forces stay absolutely loyal to the Party. So no way was Mr. Hu clueless on any front in this ASAT brouhaha."

This isn't China's only space controversy, long-time satellite-watcher Peter Brown notes in a fascinating piece for the Washington Times. "The loss of another Chinese satellite in early November is causing headaches as well, something that China would prefer to keep quiet."

This involved a spanking new Chinese communications satellite, the largest ever built to date by China. Known as Sinosat-2, it was launched on October 29 and weighed more than 5 tons. In a matter of days, however, any celebrating ended rather abruptly. Sinosat-2 suffered a complete failure and soon was hurtling back into the earth's atmosphere...

Despite initial reports that Sinosat-2 was experiencing problems, Chinese space officials elected to remain silent for two weeks or more -- until late November -- until accounts of this Chinese satellite in distress began appearing in the Asian press...

Why was China reluctant to admit that Sinosat-2 was in serious trouble? First, this satellite represented China's first flight of its new Dongfanghong or DFH-4 spacecraft bus. Second, Sinosat-2 was the first of a new generation of jamming-resistant satellites created by China after satellite broadcasts were jammed in 2002. These incidents were characterized by the Chinese government as deliberate acts of sabotage carried out by the outlawed Falun Gong involving a satellite known as Sinosat-1.

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Big Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

I spoke with John Pike, the long-time military space observer and director of GlobalSecurity.org, shortly after the news broke that the Chinese had destroyed a satellite, more than 500 miles above the Earth. He wondered how much "adult supervision" there had been of the sat-killer test. Perhaps this was a small group of China star warriors looking to teach the U.S. a lesson, he mused -- not a big, strategic move from the chiefs in Beijing.

Now, there have been lots of theories about why China decided now to conduct their anti-satellite test. Maybe it was a way to scare the Bush administration back to the negotiating table. Maybe it was done to compete with India's recent ballistic missile test. Maybe it was a designed to show the U.S. how costly an intervention on Taiwain's side would be. (The CIA is "especially concerned," because "the Chinese have become so adept at camouflage," according to Aviation Week.)

Today's analysis in the New York Times, however, seems to lend credence to Pike's guess. "Bush administration officials said that they had been unable to get even the most basic diplomatic response from China," the paper says. Those American officials "were uncertain whether China’s top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, were fully aware of the test or the reaction it would engender."

The American officials presume that Mr. Hu was generally aware of the missile testing program, but speculate that he may not have known the timing of the test. China’s continuing silence would appear to suggest, at a minimum, that Mr. Hu did not anticipate a strong international reaction, either because he had not fully prepared for the possibility that the test would succeed, or because he did not foresee that American intelligence on it would be shared with allies, or leaked.

In an interview late Friday, Stephen J. Hadley, President Bush’s national security adviser, raised the possibility that China’s leaders might not have fully known what their military was doing.

“The question on something like this is, at what level in the Chinese government are people witting, and have they approved?” Mr. Hadley asked.

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Big Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?

China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?

Last week, I described China's satellite strike as "next-gen," and America's ability to fend off such an attack however somewhere around zero. After all, there's never been a direct ground-to-space satellite smack; and the Air Force itself says such defenses are improbable, at best.

But veteran space analyst Jim Oberg says the anti-satellite test was a little easier than it looked. And there may be some defenses, after all. Because there's a big difference between a "satellite-killing demonstration and the needs of a real weapon — one that would be a genuine threat to other countries' satellites," he notes.

Now it's important to keep in mind that the Chinese carefully timed the launch of their kinetic kill vehicle so that it would intercept the known position and orbit of the satellite it was aiming for—intercepting a target in an arbitrary orbit is a much more difficult proposition...

The missile's kill mechanism is that of a bullet: It crashes head-on into a target moving at 28 000 km/hr, adding its own speed to the total impact velocity...

The Chinese targeted a low-orbiting, obsolete, weather satellite, where the kinetic kill energy was very great. However, the really strategic satellites fly much higher — the [GPS] navigation network is 20 000 km up... [T]he orbital velocities [there] are so much lower that the impact energy would be only about a tenth as high as in last week's test.

Distance introduces a second burden: terminal navigation. When a target satellite is close to the Earth, ground radars can track it and relay final course corrections, both to the rocket during its ascent and to the kill vehicle, once it has been deployed on its hoped-for collision course. Radar operates at an inverse fourth power law, which means that for the Chinese system to aim many times farther than low Earth orbit—as it would have to do to track objects geosynchronously—the demands on a ground-based radar would be simply impossible...

Nor are space targets helpless victims to such kinetic kill attacks, especially at higher altitudes... [A] target satellite can take steps to interfere with the attacker obtaining a workable targeting solution, and the farther from Earth the attack occurs, the more the odds favor the target.

Objects can hide in space, to a greater or lesser degree, by lowering their radar reflectivity or optical brightness along the attacker's expected line of approach. This makes terminal navigation and guidance more difficult. That effect can be augmented with decoys, which can either be deployed when an attack is detected or can be sent, as a matter of routine, to fly in formation with the high-value target. A decoy doesn't have to be a throwaway subsatellite, it could be an inflatable spar a few tens of meters long with a pseudo-target at the end to attract the on-rushing kinetic kill vehicle away from the real spacecraft. Such a decoy could be deployed in a matter of minutes, and even re-stowed afterwards for future re-use.

Even the simple suspicion that a target may have such a capability would discourage a potential attacker. And the realization that a target might also be able to detect and characterize even a failed attack would be an additional deterrent. There would be no way for the attacking country to get away with attempted mayhem.

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Big Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

(Big ups: Stefan Landsberger, for his awesome collection of Chinese propaganda posters)

Why Did China Smack the Sat? (Updated)

So why did China blow up one of their satellites last week? The Times offers up a few possible explanations:

Having a weapon that can disable or destroy satellites is considered a component of China’s unofficial doctrine of asymmetrical warfare. China’s army strategists have written that the military intends to use relatively inexpensive but highly disruptive technologies to impede the better-equipped and better-trained American forces in the event of an armed conflict — over Taiwan, for example...

Some analysts suggested that one possible motivation was to prod the Bush administration to negotiate a treaty to ban space weapons. Russia and China have advocated such a treaty, but President Bush rejected those calls when he authorized a policy that seeks to preserve “freedom of action” in space. Chinese officials have warned that an arms race could ensue if Washington did not change course.

Now, Beijing officials aren't even admitting they destroyed the orbiter, yet. But the China Matters blog uncovers a post by a self-proclaimed Chinese soldier, who seems to reinforce the scare-'em-into-cutting-a-deal motive:

This overweening country [the USA] began to regard space as its own back yard. The national space policy it announced in 2006 nonchalantly regarded space as its private property. At the same time, when China at the United Nations proposed a special international organization to resolve the actual problems of a space arms race that were being faced, the United States, acting as a country far in the lead in space, vehemently opposed, saying that there was no arms race in space...

We hope... [this] will smack the American carnivores back to reason. History shows us that if you don't hit Americans, they aren't willing to sit down at the negotiation table.

This was actually the fourth time the Chinese tried to destroy a satellite, GlobalSecurity.org notes. And as "reckless, self-defeating and stupid" as the test was, adds Arms Control Wonk Jeffrey Lewis, the test was legal, because there's "currently no prohibition on destructive ASAT [anti-satellite] testing. There should be."

UPDATE 01/21/07: Last week's test has given a "shiver of hope" to the "nation’s star warriors, frustrated that their plans to arm the heavens went nowhere for two decades despite more than $100 billion in blue-sky research," Bill Broad says in a tart opinion piece.

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Big Impact
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

Satellite Killer's Big Impact

There's been immediate fallout -- both physical and political -- from China's satellite killer test.

Debris from the orbital collision has already been spotted, the M-T Milcom blog notes. "As of this writing NORAD has officially cataloged 32 objects... that now pollute a vital area of space (sun-synchronous polar orbit)." The picture to the right is of a few of 'em.

"There are over 125 satellites that operate in this portion of space," the M-T blog observes. Those include reconnaissance satellites, like the Lacrosse and Advanced Keyhole orbiters, as well as weather-monitors, like the Defense Meteorological Satellites Program series. In other words, this test directly affects the American military's ability look for terrorist hideouts, and survey a potential battlefield. These are not small matters. "Our space assets are the first asset on the scene," GlobalSecurity.org's John Pike tells the AP. "They are absolutely central to why we are a superpower - a signature component to America's style of warfare."

Frequent Defense Tech commenter Robot Economist, now with his own blog, warns that "this situation has the potential of becoming the next Katyusha rocket or IED problem for the United States." Even the International Space Station could be at risk. That said, RE reminds us that "it is unlikely that [China's] success... translates into any sort of immediately fieldable capability."

If the spotty record of our ground-based missile interceptors demonstrate anything, it is the difficulty of intercepting even predictable space targets... [And] the Chinese had a pretty good handicap on this test.

Robert Farley sees the anti-satellite trial as "first and foremost... a deterrent move aimed at the United States."

The US military isn't completely dependent on spy satellites (in case of war, the Taiwan Straits would be overflown by enough spy and communications aircraft to make the satellites redundant), but destroying them is a way of chipping away at US capability, and thus indicating that China can inflict real costs in case of a US intervention in a militarized China-Taiwan dispute. The public way in which the Chinese have carried out this test, as well as earlier "blinding" tests, and the recent submarine-stalks-carrier debacle indicates to me that they're as serious as possible about showing the US their capabilities, which is key to a deterrent strategy. Also, Chinese anti-satellite capabilities don't have to be targeted against US military satellites; the Chinese may threaten commercial satellites as well, which would help to metastasize the costs of any US intervention.

No wonder, then, that governments around the world are protesting the move. With one exception, apparently: Russia. Arms Control Wonk notes...

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov commented to reporters that he has heard reports of the Chinese test, but thinks that the rumors are quite abstract and are exaggerated.

In an interview, vice-preseident of the Russian Academy of geopolitcal affairs, General Leonid Ivashov, said that he thinks the Chinese used Russian developments for making their antisatellite missiles.

How do you think this is going to play out? Speak up!

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike

China's satellite shoot-down isn't just a provocative, dangerous act, writes veteran space analyst Jim Oberg. It also marks the rise of a new kind of satellite-killing technology -- one in which a weapon is shot directly from the ground, to the orbiter up on high.

Previous anti-satellite weapons tests, conducted during the Cold War, involved either co-orbiting killer satellites (the Soviet approach) or an air-launched anti-satellite missile (the U.S. approach, also considered by the Soviets but never attempted). Some tests involved shooting ground-based anti-missile missiles toward satellites, but those missiles never hit their mark.

That's because it's hard to nail an orbiter, traveling hundreds of miles up at thousands of miles per hour, from the ground. The fact that the Chinese were able to do it could have troubling repercussions beyond space, as one commenter to the FPSPACE list notes:

Assuming the [Chinese target satellite] was on the order of 3 meters in size, and assuming the kill was made in direct ascent mode as opposed to co-orbiting mode, this test demonstrates the capability to achieve a velocity error on the order of 3 meters / ~1000 seconds, i.e., way less than 1 cm per second. This has obvious implications for their CEPs [Circular Error Probables, the accuracy] of Chinese ballistic missiles.

Now, Beijing seems to have cheated just a bit in this test, Oberg observes.

The last orbital data released by NORAD seem to show one end of the [Chinese target] satellite's orbit being raised by about 20 miles (32 kilometers). Such tweaking is characteristic of a satellite lining up its orbital path for a rendezvous with a ground-launched visitor. The international space station does this in preparation for Russian spacecraft visits.

In fact, the reason the U.S. Air Force chose the air-launched anti-satellite system is that it does not have to have its target line up with a ground-based missile pad. Naturally, a real target in the real world would never make such a helpful maneuver.

Without the target’s maneuver to make itself easier to kill, a ground-based shot would likely have to be made from the side — or “out of plane,” in space navigation parlance. With such a geometry, the final approach for physical contact occurs under much higher rates of angular change, making terminal guidance much more difficult. It can be done, but with less reliability.

But even with some fudging, this remains a very serious technical accomplishment. Oberg's piece has lots more -- including some possible (repeat, possible) countermeasures to a satellite strike. Be sure to read the whole thing.

Of course, for a long time, directly attacking the orbiter with another piece of metal seemed like the least likely, least effective way to knock a satellite out. Since 2004, the U.S. Air Force has had in its arsenal a series of radio frequency jammers, to interfere with satellite operations. Three or four times a year, small groups of junior officers gather at an Air Force Research Laboratory facility in New Mexico to figure out how to take American satellites off-line using nothing more than sweet talk and off-the-shelf gear.

Then there are the lasers. Not only did China recently light up an American orbiter with a ground-based laser. But, as Dan Dupont reminds us, the U.S. military spent much of the 90's testing out a satellite-shooting beam weapon of its own: the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser, or "MIRACL."

"In October 1997, the Air Force commissioned a test of an ASAT [anti-satellite] system based on the MIRACL laser," the Union of Concerned Scientists notes. "This system was directed toward a satellite orbiting 420 km above the Earth. The MIRACL laser apparently had technical difficulties, but the results of the test were startling."

A lower-power (30-watt) laser intended for alignment of the system and tracking of the satellite was the primary laser source used during the test, and it appeared that this lower-power laser was sufficiently powerful itself to blind the satellite temporarily, although it could not destroy the sensor. That a commercially available laser and a 1.5 m mirror could be an effective ASAT highlighted a US vulnerability that had not been fully appreciated. Although the Pentagon described the test as defensive (i.e., to learn about the vulnerability of US satellites to laser attack), many—in particular the Russians—expressed concern about the offensive capabilities of this system and whether it constituted a breach of the ABM [anti-ballistic missile] Treaty, and formally requested negotiations on an ASAT weapon ban.

(Big ups: AT)

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Satellite Killer's Broad Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

China Space Attack: Unstoppable

China has shown it can destroy a satellite in orbit. What could the U.S. do to stop Beijing, if it decided to attack an American orbiter next? Short answer: nothing.

It takes about 20 minutes to fire a ballistic missile into space, and have its "kill vehicle" strike a satellite at hypersonic speed -- over 15,000 miles per hour -- in low-earth orbit. That's far too quick for anything in the American arsenal to respond, in time. There's "no possibility of shielding" a relatively-fragile satellite against such a strike. "And it is impractical [for a satellite] to carry enough fuel to maneuver away even if you had specific and timely warning of an attack," Center for Defense Information analyst Theresea Hitchens notes.

The American military today counts on its satellites to relay orders, guide troops across battlefields, and spy on enemy hideouts. The U.S. Air Force's primer for war in space -- "Doctrine Document 2-2.1: Counterspace Operations" -- lists a number of measures that can be taken to protect American assets in orbit, including "deploying satellites into various orbital altitudes and planes" and "employing frequency-hopping techniques to complicate jamming." But those tactics are used to preserve the U.S. satellite constellation as a whole. None of them could save a single American orbiter against a direct attack. "Physical hardening of structures mitigates the impact of kinetic effects, but is generally more applicable to ground-based facilities than to space-based systems due to launch-weight considerations," the Air Force document notes. "Maneuver[ing] is limited by on-board fuel constraints, orbital mechanics, and advanced warning of an impending attack. Furthermore, repositioning satellites generally degrades or interrupts their mission."

With today's conventional defenses proving so impotent, expect a new push within the U.S. military for more exotic countermeasures. The Airborne Laser is a modified 747 that's being designed to blast missiles out of the sky, as soon as they leave they launch pad; the jet's first flight test in expected in 2009, after years and years of delays. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor is a long-range, non-explosive missile, meant for the same task. But the weapon "exists mostly on paper, and couldn't be operational before 2014," Defense Tech's David Axe noted recently.

The U.S. could also try to destroy an anti-satellite missile, before it took off. Over the last several years, momentum has been building in the Pentagon for the ability to conduct "Prompt Global Strikes," hitting anywhere on Earth, in an hour or less. But near-term PGS plans -- using modified Trident ballistic missiles -- have been put on hold, for fears that such an attack could start World War III, in the process. Destroying a satellite is as clear an act of war as there can be, however. Perhaps those Trident attacks will now be seen as worth the risk.

In the meantime, GlobalSecurity.org director John Pike figures the Chinese will continue to test their satellite-killing weapons. It takes a dozen or more trials before a strategic weapon like this is deemed reliable enough to be considered operational. "So expect one or two more tests like this every year, for a long time," he says.

The Chinese test, now confirmed by the National Security Council, would be the first successful anti-satellite weapons trial since 1985, when the United States used an F-15 and a kill vehicle to destroy the Solwind research satellite. And that trial was dangerous -- not just for its target, but for nearly everything orbiting in space, Hitchens notes. Even small pieces of space debris can be lethal to spacecraft. The '85 test "resulted in more than 250 pieces of debris, the last of which deorbited in 2002."

The Chinese trial could "lead to nearly 800 debris fragments of size 10 cm or larger, nearly 40,000 debris fragments with size between 1 and 10 cm, and roughly 2 million fragments of size 1 mm or larger," the Union of Concerned Scientists' David Wright notes on the Arms Control Wonk blog. "Roughly half of the debris fragments with size 1 cm or larger would stay in orbit for more than a decade."

"This raises an interesting public policy question because we are so much more dependent on commercial and military satellites that the ASAT [anti-satellite] options available to us are much more complicated than those available to the Chinese," adds Jeffrey Lewis. "This is a race that favors them, unfortunately."

ALSO:
* China Tests Satellite Killer?
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Broad Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

China Tests Satellite Killer?

"China performed a successful anti-satellite weapons test" last week, according to Aviation Week. In the trial, a ballistic missile, armed with a non-explosive warhead, "destroy[ed] an aging Chinese weather satellite target" over 500 miles above the Earth, U.S. intelligence agencies believe.

The news comes just a few months after reports of China testing high-powered lasers to temporarily blind American orbiters. "If the test is verified it will signify a major new Chinese military capability," AvWeek says. And it could be the spark that ignites an arms race in space, analysts believe. Theresa Hitchens, with the Center for Defense Information called it an "irresponsible and self-defeating act" that will give "space hawks… more ammunition to take the United States down a similarly dangerous path."

Details emerging from space sources indicate that the Chinese Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) polar orbit weather satellite... was attacked by an ASAT [anti-satellite] system launched from or near the Xichang Space Center.

The attack is believe to have occurred as the weather satellite flew at 530 mi. altitude 4 deg. west of Xichang, located in Sichuan province...

Although intelligence agencies must complete confirmation of the test, the attack is believed to have occurred at about 5:28 p.m. EST Jan. 11. U. S. intelligence agencies had been expecting some sort of test that day, sources said....

USAF radar reports on the Chinese FY-1C spacecraft have been posted once or twice daily for years, but those reports jumped to about 4 times per day just before the alleged test.

The USAF radar reports then ceased Jan. 11, but then appeared for a day showing "signs of orbital distress". The reports were then halted again. The Air Force radars may well be busy cataloging many pieces of debris, sources said.

Harvard University's Jeffrey Lewis, a self-admitted skeptic about China's space ambitions, has been hearing from many sources in recent months that "China’s ASAT work seem[s] to have been ramping up." He writes over at his blog, Arms Control Wonk:

If China has conducted an ASAT test, this is extremely bad. I had been hoping that the Bush Administration would push for a ban on anti-satellite testing, either in the form of a code of conduct. The Bush folks, however, have been fond of saying that wasn’t necessary, because 'there is no arms race in space.'

Well, we have one now, instigated by an incredibly short-sighted Chinese government.

(Big ups: EM)

UPDATE 11:42 AM: Why would Beijing pull a stunt like this? The China Matters blog has a theory. Meanwhile, one keen space-watcher notes that, if this anti-sat weapon was really "kinetic" -- i.e., hit-to-kill, non-explosive -- instead of a plain ol' exploding weapon, that's extremely bad news. That means the booster rocket has to be very accurate "in order to deliver the kill vehicle to the desired initial trajectory.... Then the kill vehicle needs to tweak its trajectory into a precise collision course using on-board propulsion and either on-board target tracking or... command guidance from the ground." That's no mean task.

ALSO:
* China Space Attack: Unstoppable
* Beijing's Next-Gen Sat Strike
* Satellite Killer's Broad Impact
* Why Did China Smack the Sat?
* China Sat-Killer Not Yet Weapons Grade?
* Who Ordered the Satellite Strike?

Gates' China Choice

Topic A at today's Senate confirmation hearings for Defense Secretary Bob Gates was Iraq. Topic B was Afghanistan. Topic C? That was the fate of Texas A&M's football team, naturally. (You know how politicos love their sports-talk.)

Somewhere down around the bottom of the alphabet was China. Which is really too bad. Because one of the biggest choices Gates will have to make in his term at the Pentagon will be how to handle Beijing.

As guys like Tom Barnett have endlessly pointed out, there are, roughly speaking, two competing camps in the Defense Department. One group -- mostly Army guys and Marines -- wants to retool our military, to go after terrorists and tackle insurgents. The other -- largely made up of Air Force and Navy-types -- thinks that Iraq and Al-Qaeda are distractions from the one mortal enemy that can really threaten America long-term: the Chinese.

Donald Rumsfeld's words favored the first camp. "[P]repar[ing] for wider asymmetric challenges" is a "fundamental imperative" for the military, the Pentagon noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review, its every-four-years look at grand strategy. We're in the middle of a "Long War." Iraq and Afghanistan are just the opening battles.

But follow the money, and a very different set of priorities emerges. The Pentagon is spending its $70 billion budget on new weapons like it's the Cold War all over again – with China stepping in for the Soviets. Nearly $10 billion a year goes to ballistic missile interceptors originally designed to stop Russian missiles; $9 billion to new-jack fighter jets meant to take on MiGs; $3.3 billion to next-gen tanks and fighting vehicles; $1 billion for the Trident II nuclear missile upgrade; and $2 billion for a new strategic bomber.

Gates can continue the trend. Or more than five years after 9/11, he can commit to focusing the Defense Department firmly, absolutely on the two-front war which he admits the U.S. is "not winning." That's the fundamental choice to be made. You can change tactics in Iraq –- or not. But as long as China remains front-and-center for so much of the military, it's hard to see how the U.S. winds up winning this "Long War."

UPDATE 6:10 PM: So what will Gates do? Here's the only interchange on China from today's hearings:

SEN. INHOFE: The -- in 2000, we formed the U.S.-China Security Economic Review Commission, and it's usually referred to the U.S.- China Commission. They have had -- come out with five reports. This is the fifth report that just came out. I've been disturbed that no one seems to care about these. They don't seem to read these and understand what's in them. I have a couple of questions about that I want to ask you. But I am concerned about China, and I'd like to hear what your thoughts are.

And just in the last month the Chinese hackers, as you, I'm sure, have read, have shut down the e-mail and official computer work at the Naval War College. The -- this is referred to by this commission as the "tightened rein" "Titan Rain."

In September the Department of Commerce experienced a massive shutdown of its computer system. This goes on and on.

In July the State Department acknowledged that Chinese attacks had broken into systems overseas and in Washington.

Recently China's been -- used lasers to blind our satellites.
On October 26th a Song-class Chinese submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk. They'd been following them undetected for a long period of time.

I've had occasion to spend quite a bit of time in Africa, and I noticed that China's presence in Africa, particularly in those states around the Sea of Guinea and where they have great oil reserves, is there. And they are way ahead of us. It happens that China and United States are the two countries that depend on foreign sources of oil more than any of the other countries.

The -- as this continues, I'd like to ask you what your feeling is about this as a top priority, about how you view China, about whether or not you have read these reports, and if not, if you would or if you plan to do that, and if you agree with some of that which you have heard coming out in these reports.

MR. GATES: Yes, sir. I have not read the reports.

SEN. INHOFE: And I would also say that we watched this -- as we were drawing down in the 1990s, they increased their military procurement by over 1,000 percent. So this is a great concern.
Go ahead.

MR. GATES: Yes, sir. I have not read the reports. I would be more than willing to do so.

I've been aware, just from reading in the newspapers -- it's been a number of years since I received any classified intelligence on what the Chinese were up to. But it's been my impression that they've had a very aggressive intelligence-gathering effort against the United States. Some of these other things that you've mentioned -- this is the first time I've heard about that. And clearly, if confirmed, this would be something that I would want to get well informed on quickly

(Bigs ups: Inside Defense for the transcript.)

UPDATE 7:15 PM: "I've been watching defense secretaries in confirmation hearings for 30 years, off and on, but I don't think I've seen any perform more forthrightly than Gates did this morning," coos Fred Kaplan.

The most eyebrow-raising moment—of many such moments—in Robert Gates' confirmation hearings today came when Sen. Robert Byrd, the stentorian Democrat of West Virginia, asked if he favored attacking Iran.

Most witnesses in Gates' position would duck the question, citing the time-honored practice of avoiding "hypotheticals." No senator would have condemned him for following precedent. But Gates plunged right in and said, basically, no.

"We have seen in Iraq," Gates replied, "that once war is unleashed, it becomes unpredictable." The Iranians couldn't retaliate with a direct attack on the United States, he said, but they could close off the Persian Gulf to oil exports, send much more aid to anti-American insurgents in Iraq, and step up terrorist attacks worldwide...

When Michigan Sen. Carl Levin, the panel's senior Democrat, asked if the United States was winning the war in Iraq, he said, "No, sir." Later, when James Inhofe, R-Okla., asked if he agreed that we weren't losing the war either, Gates replied, "Yes," but added, "at this point..."

It is impossible to imagine any of George W. Bush's previous Cabinet appointees, or any of his sitting Cabinet officers, making such stark—and, at least implicitly, critical—statements in an open Senate hearing.

In short, Gates may well be that entity that Washington has not seen for many years: a truly independent secretary of defense.

China Wants Weapons Whizzes

Forget buying arms -- the real way to develop your military is buying arms designers.

The seems to be the verdict of China's People's Liberation Army, anyway.

Remember the Australian Metal Storm system? You know, the one that fires more than a million rounds a minute? You might remember Sharon Weinberger used it last month as an illustrative example of her new Stupid Weapons Score Card. Presumably it scores pretty high on the scale…

Well, I guess the Chinese Government disagrees with that assessment, since they reportedly offered the system’s designer more than $100 million dollars to move to Beijing, after repeated attempts to by various pieces of equipment [and after Al-Qaeda just put out a recruiting call to all nuclear scientists with a jihadist bent -- ed]. It’s hard to understand why he didn’t head north to the Middle Kingdom after assurances like this: “We don’t need any Metal Storm weapons, we don’t need any of the paperwork, none of that. What we want is you.”

If nothing else, I guess it’s good to be wanted.

-- Matthew Tompkins

Chinese Laser vs. U.S. Sats?

"China has fired high-power lasers at U.S. spy satellites flying over its territory in... a test of Chinese ability to blind the spacecraft," Defense News is reporting. And, at least in theory, those lasers might be able temporarily take offline America's most powerful orbiting spies, like the giant electro-optical Keyhole spacecraft or radar-based satellites like the Lacrosse.

Now, the article is a little short on details. "It remains unclear how many times the ground-based laser was tested against U.S. spacecraft or whether it was successful," the story says.

And there's a touch of hyperbole in the piece. According to the article, a recent Pentagon report "acknowledge[d] China has the ability to blind U.S. satellites, thanks to a powerful ground-based laser." That's not exactly right. What the report actually says isn't quite so definitive:

Evidence exists that China is improving its situational awareness in space, which will give it the ability to track and identify most satellites. Such capability will allow for the deconfliction of Chinese satellites, and would also be required for offensive actions. At least one of the satellite attack systems appears to be a groundbased laser designed to damage or blind imaging satellites.

Nevertheless, citing unnamed "top officials," the trade journal asserts that "China not only has the [anti-satellite] capability, but has exercised it. It is not clear when China first used lasers to attack American satellites. Sources would only say that there have been several tests over the past several years."

Within the U.S. military, there's a contingent that's been worried for years about China arming up like this. The other day, I was talking to an Air Force colonel, about the Pentagon's plans for "prompt global strike" -- the ability to launch, in a matter of hours, a bolt-from-the-blue attack against an enemy thousands and thousands of miles away. Some in the armed forces talk about the strikes as a way to take out an Iranian nuclear facility, a terrorist chieftain, or a North Korean missile on the launchpad. But this colonel had a different target in mind for the instant attack: a Chinese "anti-satellite, ground-based laser wreak[ing] havoc with our constellation."

If China really is pursuing such a weapon, it wouldn't be the only country looking at lasers to interfere with enemy eyes above the sky. In a 1997 test, the U.S. fired a chemical laser at a satellite orbiting 420 kilometers above the Earth. The "laser apparently had technical difficulties," according to the Union of Concerned Scientists, "but the results of the test were startling."

A lower-power (30-watt) laser intended for alignment of the system and tracking of the satellite was the primary laser source used during the test, and it appeared that this lower-power laser was sufficiently powerful itself to blind the satellite temporarily, although it could not destroy the sensor.

These days, the Air Force's Starfire Optical Range is shooting lasers in the sky, trying to figure out how best to correct for atmospheric interference. Astronomers looking into the heavens will be the most immediate beneficiaries. But Starfire could help out anti-satellite weaponeers, too. These days, ground-based lasers aren't powerful enough -- or good enough at traveling through the air -- to permanently take out a satellite; the best the beams might be able to do is blind the thing, temporarily. That could change, if Starfire (or its Chinese equivalent) does its job right.

UPDATE 10:12 AM: Color Theresea Hitchens, the Center for Defense Information's resident spacewar guru, "not convinced – nor impressed."

The folks quoted in this story are neither space nor China experts -- and those folks are easy to find. And there is the odd timing: just as Griffin goes to China, over the earlier objections of Rummy and the P-gon. Statements like "China's burgeoning antisatellite capabilities..." -- who SAYS? Even the P-gon hasn't gone that far in its reports on Chinese Military Power.

All that said, I would NOT be surprised if the Chinese were testing a Ground-Based Laser. So are we, at Starfire Optical Range. If they lased U.S. satellites though, how do we know they were trying to blind them rather than TRACK them -- since we say Starfire is using lasers only to track sats? China doesn't have all that great tracking ability, and it needs it, not just to track our stuff but their own. There isn't any real way to tell, I don't think, what the INTENT behind such lasing would be.

NOT that it is a good thing -- lasing other people's sats without their consent, or at least specific statements of your intent to do only tracking, in peacetime ought to be off the playing field, hence the need for a code of conduct of some sort in space operations.

Finally, with regard to laser blinding -- it is not as easy as it sounds to "blind" an optical satellite with a laser. I'm no physicist, but as I understand it, imaging satellites usually work in several wavelengths, meaning first of all you'd have to have lasers in all the colors that match those wavelengths to blind the sat, not just one single wavelength laser beam. Secondly, because of the way imaging sats work, taking pictures of strips of the Earth using strips of pixels, you'd have to figure out how to blind all the pixels -- which apparently is so hard as to be well nigh impossible. And I note that as far as I know, we haven't gotten that far with Starfire, so what makes us so sure the Chinese are ahead of us there?

If you ask me, the story raises more questions than answers.

China's Killer Hovercraft

China is about to buy a six pack of heavily-armed hovercraft, Defense News reports. Sino-hawks here are already starting to freak out over the sale.

"A few years ago, the 'don’t worry, be happy' school of analysis of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] said that we should all be reassured that the PLA couldn’t attack Taiwan because it didn’t have enough hovercraft. Clearly, this is changing," University of Miami's June Teufel Dreyer tells the military trade.

The 540-ton Zubr LCAC, the world’s largest amphibious assault hovercraft, can reach speeds in excess of 60 knots, can travel 300 nautical miles and can shoulder various large loads: 130 tons of cargo, 500 troops, three 50-ton medium battle tanks, 10 BTR-70 armored personnel vehicles or eight BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles.

"The Zubr will greatly enhance the PLA Navy’s capability to launch a large scale amphibious assault operation," Sinodefence.com observes.

At the moment the PLA has to rely on conventional landing ships for such an operation. The slow process for the troops and vehicles to swim from their carrier ships to the beachhead makes them highly vulnerable to enemy firepower. The LCAC’s ability to deliver troops, vehicles and cargos directly to the beach makes a huge advantage. China has developed several models of its own indigenous LCACs, but most of these are unarmed small designs carrying no more than 20 soldiers.

The deal to buy the hovercraft from Russia's Almaz Shipbuilding has been in the works for five years. And the initial order is teeny: just six ships. But "there are signs that China plans to build its own version of the Zubr-class craft," Defense News says.

"It could be that the Chinese want to test the vehicles or purchase a few and then begin... produc[ing] them in the PRC [People’s Republic of China]," Dreyer observes. "The amount ordered here, six, won’t be enough to mount an invasion. But it’s a start."

Eyeing China's Missileers

Hey all, Jeffrey Lewis from Arms Control Wonk.com here. After spending a couple of days crashing at Shachtman's place in NYC, I figured I needed a crosspost to say "Thanks."

ITAR TASS reports that China test fired a DF-31 ICBM from the Taiyuan Space Launch Center:

China has carried out a regular test launch of a Dongfeng-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. Itar-Tass was told at the Russian Defence Ministry on Tuesday that "the Chinese side had notified the Russian Defence Ministry in advance about the upcoming launching of the intercontinental missile".

"The Dongfeng-31 missile was fired from the Wuzhai launch site towards the Taklimakan desert at about midnight on Monday", a Russian ministry official said. The head section of the missile, he added, flew approximately 2.5 thousand kilometres. The Russian space control facilities had tracked the missile's start and flight.

The new Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles will be put into
service already this year. Improved longer-range Dongfeng-31A missiles are expected to be commissioned in 2007. These two types of intercontinental silo-based ballistic missiles are compact systems, which can be moved by means of tractors along general-purpose roads.

FAS has a nice summary of the DF-31 program in relation to this, probably the sixth flight test since 1999.

The Taiyuan Space Launch Center is called the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center by the US intelligence community for reasons that I've never understood -- the facility is NOWHERE near Wuzhai. In fact, isn't all that close to Taiyuan -- 284 km from Taiyuan City either by train or bus.

Anyway, I found the Taiyuan facility in GoogleEarth a while back, checking it against the map on the China Great Wall Industry Corporation website. You can see most of the major areas of the center, including the technology center, telemetry station (I think) and launch complex. (Mark Wade has a very nice map, too.)

If you look a little further north of the launch complex, you can see an area that is not on the map -- a some buildings and big concrete launch pads that might be a candidate (and I stress might) for bthe DF-31 area.

Just a guess, though. The facility is huge, with something like 4 launch sites and more than a dozen support areas. I've posted a 1982 DIA report on the construction of a new assembly/checkout facility on the southeast edge of the facility -- unfortunately, that area is low resolution.

So, take a look at the site -- one aspect I would like to find is China's R&D silo for the DF-5, which is at what the intelligence community called Launch Site B. I may have to zip over to the National Archives to see if there are any reports on the facility with handy maps.

-- Jeffrey Lewis

China Top Card in Pentagon Shuffle

So, imagine you are the Rumsfeld Defense Department. You are locked in a "global struggle against violent extremists" stretching from"stretching from Indonesia through the Middle East,". You have 150,000 troops stationed in Iraq as the central front in said struggle. The United States is facing major foreign policy crises in Iran and Lebanon, of other which might involve your beloved Pentagon.

You decide to elevate one Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with regional responsibilities to become a full Assistant Secretary over a region. This is an easy call. You pick: Asia-Pacific.

Oh, sure, sure, you have no exit strategy for Iraq and you are sizing up air defenses around Tehran, but c'mon ... real men hate on China.

Of course, focusing on China ... er the Asia-Pacific ... was the plan, from the first Defense Strategy Review by Andy Marshall which reportedly "cast the Pacific as the most important region for military planners..." I kind of admire the sticktuitiveness of the whole thing, 9/11 and Iraq be damned.

You almost wonder why they didn't have the stones to pin the 9/11 attack on Jiang Zemin. After all, their friends did.

I've posted the new organization at my blog, Arms Control Wonk.com. USD(P) Eric Edelman explained the issue as one of matching up to State and NSC:

The secretary sensed that we were misaligned in some ways ... and we wanted to make it easier for Policy and the (combatant commands) to figure out what the right address was (in the other agencies) to go forward solving problems. I think this will make it a little easier to operate interagency.

Now, when I was at Policy -- oh so briefly -- the fact that the State Department Bureaus were headed by Assistant Secretaries, one level higher than the equivalent DOD offices, was kind of irritating.

And maybe I am being too cynical. As an "Asia expert" -- whatever that means -- I am psyched to see my region getting attention. And, were I ever lucky enough to hold that office at OSD, I'd appreciate the extra step to full Assistant Secretary.

But, really, wouldn't a single "Assistant Secretary for South West and Central Asia" with DASD's for the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia better protect the country's interests?

-- Jeffrey Lewis, cross posted at Arms Control Wonk.com

Compass - Chinese SatNav or Galileo Bluff?

As has been widely reported, China plans to construct its own global satellite navigation network. Or so it would appear. No one’s quite sure. The system, dubbed Compass, is mired in confusion, with possible intentions ranging from a modest upgrade of their regional Beidou system to a full blown competitor to GPS and Galileo.

China invested in the European Galileo system through the Galileo Joint Undertaking. Remarkably, this investment will not allow the Chinese any role in Galileo when it transitions to the Supervisory Authority at the end of the year, likely due to the sensitive nature of Galileo’s encrypted signals. It’s no surprise, then, that China would feel betrayed by its partnership in the Joint Undertaking. Compass may be a result of China’s desire to strike out on its own– or a bluff aimed at wrangling a more substantive role in Galileo.

The business case for Galileo’s commercial signals is questionable, since most people are content with using GPS and the free Galileo signals. Another commercial competitor, such as Compass, would surely hurt Galileo. As such, China can easily use Compass as leverage for better standing within the Supervisory Authority.

China has ordered 18-20 rubidium atomic clocks, a key component of satellite navigation systems. However, this is nowhere near enough to create a global constellation, which requires at least 21 satellites, especially since there are usually multiple clocks per satellite, with GPS satellites having at least three and Galileo having four.

At best, China would be able to build eight or nine satellites with just two clocks each, which would allow for a regional navigation system for East Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Such a system would not be a commercial threat to Galileo, but has potential to become a global competitor fairly quickly if China buys more clocks; this initial order may only represent a first installment.

The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) database has 36 satellite slots registered to Compass. Fourteen are in geosynchronous orbits, and the remaining 22 are in the medium orbits traditionally used for navigation systems. While there is a tendency to register more slots with the ITU than will realistically be filled, such a large number of registrations for a regional system would be excessive and place China in a poor position with the ITU for future registrations.

What is Europe to do? The economic returns on Galileo must be protected if the project is to succeed. China could be given rights under the Supervisory Authority, minimizing its need for Compass. However, this would probably allow Chinese companies to build Galileo ground receivers, a potentially lucrative market that Europe would like to keep for itself. It would also give China access to the encrypted, and sensitive, public-safety signals. The stakes are high, but can Europe afford to call China’s bluff?

An interesting aside: there is no guarantee that the clocks would be used for Compass. Another possible application is naval signal reconnaissance satellites similar to the Navy’s Ocean Surveillance Satellites program. In that case, the clocks are used for radio inferometery, in turn determining the origin of the intercepted signals. Such a capability for the Chinese would undoubtedly have significant military implications. That possibility, however, is a subject for another day.

Another consideration: there is a possibility that Compass could jam GPS and Galileo. Even as a regional system, Compass could have significant military implications. These aspects will be discussed in another entry tomorrow.

-- Ryan Caron

Beijing Feeds the Hype

In the last few days, China has voiced its disapproval of the new Pentagon report evaluating China’s military. The comments have been about what you’d expect, along the lines of the Foreign Ministry spokesman that accused the Pentagon of a "Cold War mentality."

But that didn't stop Beijing from feeding the hype by unveiling an ambitious new program to “enhance its capability to innovate, develop and rapidly supply new-generation weaponry” on the same day it was criticizing the US for "continuing to peddle the so-called 'China threat.'"

The 15-year endeavor will include “new and high-technologies for the space industry, aviation, ship and marine engineering, nuclear energy and fuel, and information technology for both military and civilian purposes,” with a “focus on development of new and high-tech weaponry.”

The effort to develop new technologies may run up against China’s continuing difficulties with fraud in its scientific and R&D communities, although the government is also introducing initiatives to confront these problems.

In truth, the new military technology plan doesn’t appear to mark any actual departure from the trends the Pentagon report already noted – this is new PR and packaging, not new policy. But you’d think someone would realize that it’s difficult to protect your international image as a peaceful, stabilizing presence the same day you’re trying to instill national pride in your new, powerful, high-tech military. Maybe they should divert a few yuan to modernizing their media operation.

It’s actually been a rough couple of weeks for Chinese spokesmen addressing security relations with the US. Last week, they had to deal with a Taiwanese sales rep for Lockheed who pled guilty to spying for China and attempting to purchase US military technology for shipment to China. A few days later, they were criticizing a State Dept announcement that none of the Department’s thousands of new Lenovo computers would be used on classified networks, out of security concerns with the Chinese company’s systems. The FBI’s Chinese spy is still in the news as well.

So it looks to be a trend of hawks and pessimists steering the technology/security policies of both countries lately. Not to worry – our China policy remains as muddled as ever: In developments that are apparently completely unrelated, this month China (and the American Chamber of Commerce in China) asked the US to relax export controls of high-tech goods, and apparently that won’t be a problem.

-- Matthew Tompkins

Yellow Peril's Annual Comeback

Did you miss it? I’m a little out of the loop on the far side of the Pacific, so I did. But yesterday was the annual CHINA IS COMING TO GET US!! day. I’m always stumped on an appropriate gift for the special occasion... Flowers? A card? The most expensive weapons system ever?

That’s right folks, it's time for the Pentagon's yearly report on China’s military power. Get ready for the big headlines and what are sure to be some choice quotes from the SecDef and your talking-head of choice.

In the coming weeks and months, the usual China-hawks are sure to mine the report for every quote that might make China look like the next evil empire. From the opposite extreme, habitual critics of the Pentagon will likely dig up the same excerpts to paint a department full of Sino-phobes. This AFP piece makes a good start at finding the choicest of these quotes, although with the good form (or indecision) of allowing you, the reader, to decide whether you’re anti-Pentagon or anti-China. But the full study itself is actually much more balanced than these quotes would imply.

The report accurately recounts the undeniable fact that China’s military is going through tremendous amounts of modernization and improvement. It will undoubtedly become a global force that solidifies the greater influence that China has in world affairs. The study also notes, however, that politically and strategically, China has not been making moves that indicate a nation looking to throw its weight around militarily: showing continually increasing interest in effective international organizations; contributing to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Caribbean; making efforts to resolve border tensions with India and be a moderating force in Indo-Pakistani tensions; playing a pivotal role in seeking a diplomatic solution to the North Korea nuclear issue. All seem to illustrate a China interested in becoming “a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success of the global system.”

Taiwan is, of course, the fundamental exception to China not throwing its weight around. The report discusses in detail China’s continuing efforts to gain the upper-hand in a potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, with a particular emphasis on deterring or counteracting foreign intervention (including China’s likely long-term goal of acquiring or developing a carrier-force in support of broader efforts towards sea-denial). There is little room for doubt or question as to how seriously China considers the Taiwan issue – it is the exception to China’s otherwise very pragmatic foreign and security policy. Even here, though, the DOD study points out that in recent years and in the likely future, China has been interested in pursuing all means that may resolve the Taiwan issue: “political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military.” For example, it draws particular attention to Beijing’s “posture of restraint following President Chen [Shui-bian]’s decision to suspend the National Unification Council and National Unification Guidelines.”

The best doomsday scenario, of course, is of a China-US confrontation – Taiwan is just a possible flashpoint. In this vein, much can be made of the report’s repeated mention of China’s efforts to observe US military forces in action and apply lessons learned. (A recent RAND report made the same observations.) The big thing to notice, though, is that almost every example of this watchfulness has as much to do with China wanting to emulate US military tactics and equipment, as wanting to counter them. A particularly ironic example of these “lessons learned” can be found in the Pentagon’s analysis of why China will be deterred from military action against Taiwan in any but the most extreme situations: high monetary costs of war at home, an expensive reconstruction program in Taiwan, political condemnation and repercussions within the international community and the possibility that “an insurgency against the occupation could tie up substantial forces for years.”

Hmm… It’s been a long time since I took a psychology classes, but that’s called projecting, right?

The report isn’t without a few oddities, though. My particular favorite is when it notes a “resurgence in the study of ancient Chinese statecraft within the PLA,” apparently catching the crucial development of a new edition of Sun Zi’s Art of War on the PLA's reading list.

The bottom line of the report is that China’s military modernization has more do with seeking the trappings of a world-class power than pursuing a particular, military-minded agenda. Ultimately, the primary motivation for these rapid expenditures can be found in the fact that “the PLA is transforming from a mass infantry army designed to fight a protracted war of attrition within its territory to a modern, professional force.”

The Pentagon actually mentions little, if anything, that’s new from last year’s report. Nonetheless, if the last few years are any indication, we’re now in for a few months of reciprocal criticisms and “no, you’re the long-term threat to international peace and security.” There had been reasons for hope of improved military relations between China and the US, with recent China visits from National Defense University and the Combat Commander for the Pacific that culminated in an invitation to China to view US exercises near Guam. Now, we’ll have to see what, if anything, comes of these overtures.

If, rather than requiring annual reports on China’s military, Congress had required reports whenever there were significant developments or changes, it seems unlikely there would have been a report at all this year. This requirement has largely become today what the annual review of China’s Most Favored Nation status was in the 90’s: a yearly exercise in bilateral nipple-twisters that does little but restate trends that haven’t changed much from the last year and aren’t likely to change much in the next.

-- Matthew Tompkins

Censorship's Silver Lining

By now the numerous slights – both deliberate and accidental – during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Washington are well known: mixing up Taiwan and China when introducing the National Anthem; the Falun Gong heckler; President Bush unceremoniously tugging President Hu around by his coat-sleeve; administration officials dozing through Mr. Hu’s statements. What's less understood, though, is the official Chinese reaction – or really, lack of reaction --to these gaffes.

The slip-ups, and their possible implications, have all been widely discussed in the US and international media. But in the Chinese press, they haven’t been mentioned at all.

In the West, the censorship has been seen as a measure of how serious these insults are. The argument is that the assorted incidents are so shaming and embarrassing that “keeping the incident off Chinese screens was to save Hu Jintao from humiliation,” in the words of one Beijing-based analyst.

Maybe. But the far more important point this censorship communicates is the value China places on its relationship with America, and the direction the government wants that relationship to go.

China’s government could have easily used these incidents to spur anti-American, patriotic sentiments within the population. They didn’t hesitate to do so a year ago, when demonstrations over revisionist Japanese textbooks engulfed the nation, or 7 years ago in the aftermath of America’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In both of those instances, it would not have been difficult for the government to keep the population from learning of the issues. However, stirring up nationalist, anti-Japanese or anti-American sentiments suited the government’s agenda at the time, and it didn’t hesitate to do so. However shaming or embarrassing last week’s gaffes may have been, they pale in comparison to having your sovereign territory (the Embassy) bombed and offering only a few student protesters in response. But in the past, the government was willing to swallow the shame of these events in the interests of its agenda. They almost certainly would do so again if it furthered their plans – few things will rally a population to support you like rallying them against someone else. That they have chosen not to, and have rather gone to great efforts to hide the gaffes, indicates a desire to maintain and improve their relationship with America.

Broadcasting the insults would almost certainly have given fodder to hardliners within China to rail against the slap in the face. And it’s easy to imagine the reaction of our own China hawks to any anti-American demonstrations that may have resulted. If China’s censorship of last weeks events indicates the government’s desire to keep the ball away from these hardliners on both sides of the Pacific, it may be the silver lining to last week’s exhibition of America’s inept diplomacy and China’s continuing free speech issues.

[My thanks to Ms. Lauren Keane in Beijing for helping develop this analysis.]

-- Matthew Tompkins

America's Arsenal Aimed at China

Usually, I write about small things: a tight-knit group of cops, a single murder, a squad of soldiers, one crazy game. My cover story (!) in this month's Popular Mechanics is my first attempt to go big. Really big. $70 billion big.

The idea was to take the President and the SecDef at their words -- that the "Long War" against Islamic extremism is the country's top military priority. Does the Pentagon's $70 billion a year budget for new weapons back that up? Is America's arsenal being geared towards counter-terror, counter-insurgency type fights?

Take a guess.

Inside the defense establishment, the Long War has competition. In many minds, the real threat is a rising China. And, at least when it comes to acquisitions, the China crowd has the upper hand. Which means the weapons budget is packed with gear -- Joint Strike Fighters, DD(X) destroyers -- optimized for a big war in the Pacific, not a messy one in the Middle East.

The story hasn't appeared online, yet. I'll let you know when it does. But Tom Barnett, who's quoted several times in the piece, has some excerpts up on his blog.

Bump: China Tops Iraq, Osama in QDR

I'm bumping this post from ten days ago back to the top, because of the impending QDR roll-out [UPDATE 12:33 PM: It's online now]. According to today's Washington Post:

The United States is engaged in what could be a generational conflict akin to the Cold War, the kind of struggle that might last decades as allies work to root out terrorists across the globe and battle extremists who want to rule the world, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said yesterday.

The strategic vision outlined in the QDR has won high marks from defense analysts for diagnosing the problems the U.S. military will likely face. However, it is less successful in translating those concepts into concrete military capabilities, the analysts say...

The strategy does call for devoting resources to accelerate a long-range strike capability directed at hostile nations, and for new investments aimed at countering biological and nuclear weapons -- such as teams able to defuse a nuclear bomb. But it makes relatively minor adjustments in key weapons systems, with the biggest programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter and the Army's Future Combat Systems escaping virtually unscathed. This leaves less room for investments in innovative programs and forces to address the types of problems that the QDR identifies, analysts say.

For months, now, word has