“The Pentagon’s most senior planners are challenging the longstanding strategy that requires the armed forces to be prepared to fight two major wars at a time,” the New York Times reports.
The unusual mission in Iraq, which could last for years, has not just taken the slot for one of the two wars; it has upended the central concept of the two-war model…
After years of saying American forces were sufficient for a two-war strategy, “we’ve come to the realization that we’re not,” said another Defense Department official involved in the deliberations, who was granted anonymity because he could not otherwise discuss the talks, which are classified. “It’s coming to grips with reality.”
Senior leaders are trying to develop strategies that will do a better job of addressing the requirements of antiterrorism and domestic defense, while acknowledging that future American wars will most likely be irregular – against urban guerrillas and insurgents – rather than conventional.
Nations historically have prepared to fight future wars based on recent experience.
The strategy was not to “fight two major wars at a time” but was to fight two nearly simultaneous regional wars, but not at the same time.
The premise during President Clinton’s tenure was that the United States will have no viable peer competitor for the next two decades. Therefore, our Army forces could be reduced to 10 divisions with corresponding reductions in the other armed services while maintaining unmatched technological superiority as a force multiplier.
In planning for regional conflicts up to five divisions of troops could be directed toward a major regional conflict, followed shortly by up to 3 additional divisions going to a separate conflict shortly thereafter.
The assumption for both regional scenarios was that each would end quickly allowing for rapid shifting of critical combat support elements such as air or naval assets, for rapid redeployment and reconstitution of deployed forces, and for host nation or coalition peacekeeping elements to sustain the post-crisis operations in the given region.
Secretary Rumsfeld continued along those lines with his plans for transformation moving to make forces lighter, more agile, and more high tech. Emphasis has been on brigade-size units of action as opposed to the “legacy” heavy armored or mechanized divisions.
A consideration with both the Clinton and Rumsfeld plans is the assumption that all likely regional conflicts would be like Gulf War I (containing an incompetent conventional war opponent while we have time to emplace a competent coalition and overwhelming conventional force).
Reinforcing this assumption was the relatively low force-level requirements and costs for subsequent (to Gulf War I) Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and enforcing the “No Fly Zones” of Iraq.
Even as we now are fighting the current assymetric, non-contiguous war against terrorism, force transformation continues.
One hopes that in these preparations we have retained the capability to confront an unnamed emerging peer competitor who will develop stand-off systems able to counter our naval littoral capabilities, who won’t be limited to assymetric, non-contiguous operations, and who can field substantial conventional “legacy-type” military units.
Reflect on Israel’s dilemma in 1973 during Yom Kippur, when Egypt crossed the Bar Lev line and used stand-off systems to decimate initial Israeli counterattacks. At the same time, Syria launched significant operations in the Golan. Israel fought two “simultaneous major wars” and barely won due to her own abilities and because the United replaced major equipment losses through emergency aerial resupply to sustain Israeli capabilities. Who will come to our rescue?
Nations historically have prepared to fight future wars based on recent experience.
It really is simple; hidden-in-plain-sight. ANY potential REAL threat to American might, must negate carrier threats and cripple Western economies, at the same time. How? The two most likely candidates at the moment are Iran and North Korea. These have been working hand in hand, both are developing nuclear weapons, they are sharing long range missile development. Both are playing the “talks” routine while they continue to build up their weapons capabilities.
How best to use them? First, use quiet electric diesel subs and threats of nuclear mines to fend off carrier attack, threaten neighbors with potential missile attack; and then sink a few tankers to close down the Hormuz straits and Mulacca straits to oil flow to cripple European and Japanes/Tiawan economies (hence the U.S.’s).
Result will be catostrophic.
Note that I write “will be”.